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Asking Questions and Judging Answers
Lisanne Groen
Two years ago, I was teaching an introductory course in administrative law to
first-year law students. One of the topics to be discussed was that of the ‘interes‐
ted party’: when one wants to challenge a government decision in court, one has
to qualify as an ‘interested party’. In order to qualify, different requirements must
be taken into account, which derive mainly from case law.
In preparation for the class, all students had to write an assignment about this
subject. I asked one of them how she had approached this specific question and
what she thought would be a possible solution. She went over the requirements
and argued that the applicant in the assignment could not qualify as an interested
party. I complimented her on her answer and asked if anyone had found a diffe‐
rent solution. Initially, nobody responded, but after some consideration one of
the boys raised his hand hesitantly. He stated that he too had gone over the diffe‐
rent requirements, but had decided the applicant could indeed qualify as an inte‐
rested party, and he explained his decision in great detail. When I complimented
him as well, the first student became confused: ‘I thought you said my answer was
correct, did I misunderstand you?’ I said that both of the students had given a sui‐
table answer to the question. ‘So… then it’s not a very good question, is it?’ she
responded. For the record: she was not being ironic.
During law school, students have to explore different theories of jurisprudence.
They read about Montesquieu’s judge, who is nothing more than a ‘bouche de la
loi’; they study Dworkin’s ‘right answer thesis’; they read Hart, who claims that
Dworkin is a ‘noble dreamer’ and, if they’re lucky, they learn from Posner how
judges think and from Kennedy that judges always have political agendas. They
also learn that none of these theories is entirely true (or false). At present, stu‐
dents are not generally taught how theories can be put into practice – that is, how
they can be useful in solving legal problems. In most academic curricula roughly
two types of courses are taught: on the one hand, courses that focus on positive
law (students have to solve a case by means of standing law); on the other hand,
courses that focus on legal theories (legal philosophy, ethics, theory of jurispru‐
dence, and so on). The two types are hardly ever combined, which may give stu‐
dents the idea that they are unrelated. The question about the ‘interested party’
in my class was a matter of positive law and therefore only one answer could be
correct: the answer in accordance with standing law.
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In my opinion, the student’s observation concerns one of the most fundamental
issues we have to teach law students: there are always several answers to legal
questions. This may confuse them (especially first-year students, because they’re
not familiar with legal language yet), but it is an essential insight to acquire in
order to become a good lawyer. However, the fact that legal issues can be resolved
in different ways does not mean that all these solutions are equally suitable. It is
therefore particularly important that students learn to distinguish a ‘good solu‐
tion’ from a ‘possible solution’.
But how do we do that? This issue is all about academic learning and contains
several suggestions to optimize legal education in addition to useful insights in
academic teaching.
While Struiksma creates a theory of dogmatic academic education as such, Van
Klink and De Vries, Sokhi-Bulley, Hutchinson and Schwöbel-Patel, in short, focus
on what students need to know – and how they should be taught that know‐
ledge – to become good lawyers.
Struiksma investigates how the evolution of the application of mundane know‐
ledge to theory design is ‘emulated’ in legal dogmatic education. On the basis of
the ‘empirical cycle’ of De Groot, he distinguishes six steps by which theory devel‐
opment takes place: initiation by practical applications; deepening by practical
application; recognition of theory design; initiation into theory design; deepening
of theory design and independent theory design. Students must become aware of
this theory and its development, so they can eventually improve it. That is why
the different steps of the empirical cycle should be made more visible in the legal
curriculum.
Van Klink and De Vries state that it is important for law students to develop a
critical attitude. They introduce the idea of ‘skeptical legal education’, based, in
part, on Oakeshott’s understanding of liberal learning. Students have to judge the
information they receive, and to optimize the conditions for them to be able to do
so, Van Klink and De Vries identify a number of preconditions: student participa‐
tion has to be emphasized in legal courses, teachers should make clear on the
basis of which values they are reasoning, and present a variety of opinions, so
that students will discover that legal science is a matter of debate. The result will
be an interesting learning experiment that is also suitable for first-year students.
Sohki-Bulley also stresses the importance of a critical attitude. She links this atti‐
tude to ‘curiosity’ and ‘self-reflection’, and suggests a ‘toolbox of skills’ that acade‐
mic teachers can use to teach their students how to be critical, while instructing
them in different theories that are part of that toolbox. Methodology is thus
interpreted as a way of thinking (an attitude) that always influences the way in
which a specific case is approached. Sokhi-Bulley also describes a learning experi‐
ment: she asked her students to write an assignment about the same case from
different perspectives, for example from a legal positivist, a feminine and a Fou‐
cauldian point of view.
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Hutchinson argues that it is important for lawyers to know how facts are establis‐
hed in the social sciences. Since the assessment of facts is important in interpre‐
ting and developing law, lawyers need to be trained in analysing data. This trai‐
ning will result in well-founded legislation and jurisprudence and can be of use in
interdisciplinary research groups.
Finally, Schwöbel-Patel describes the course of events during a teaching workshop
where she and her colleagues were discussing the possibilities of teaching law in a
critical fashion, and the academic restraints in doing so. She gives a rough sketch
of these restraints: universities are viewed as enterprises, students as their consu‐
mers, and education has to be ‘sold’ as a financial investment in the student’s
future. Referring to Kennedy, she emphasizes the dangers of this development
and advocates a different, wider understanding of education, which she refers to
as Bildung.
The student who got confused two years ago eventually began participating in the
discussions in class, a bit wary at first, but gradually more enthusiastically. When
I asked her how that enthusiasm had developed, she answered: ‘I’m no longer
afraid that I’m saying something stupid when I disagree with the others. I’ve
become more confident, not only as a student but also… as a person, I guess.’
Now that’s what we need.
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Skeptical Legal Education
How to Develop a Critical Attitude?
Bart van Klink & Bald de Vries
1 The age of critique
If one were to ask law teachers nowadays what distinguishes academic legal edu‐
cation from professional and vocational training, they probably will refer to the
capacity of critical thinking. As law teachers at the university we want students to
develop a critical attitude. But what exactly does it mean to be critical and why is
it important to be critical? How can a critical attitude be promoted and develo‐
ped? In legal theory the notion of critical thinking seems to be annexed by follo‐
wers of the Critical Legal Studies movement.1 By wearing the banner of ‘critical’,
‘crits’ such as Duncan Kennedy, Allan Hunt and Peter Goodrich, suggest that they
have acquired the monopoly of being critical; other, mainstream liberal or conser‐
vative approaches have to be dismissed as hopelessly uncritical. ‘Critical’ in this
understanding is connected to a left-wing political agenda that aims at exposing
and subverting existing power structures in society. This is certainly one way of
being critical, but the notion of critique is a distinctively modern notion that con‐
tains other possibilities of being critical as well.
The notion of critique lies at the core of our modern self-understanding that ori‐
ginated in the Enlightenment. Kant (2003, p. 54) defined Enlightenment famou‐
sly as ‘man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity’ or, more properly,
‘speechlessness’ (Unmündigkeit). In the Critiques that he developed he sought to
liberate thinking by means of reason from the idées recues handed down by tradi‐
tion.2 As Bauman (1993, p. 6-7) argues, in a similar vein, enlightenment involves
the possibility of emancipation and liberation. It empowers the individual to libe‐
rate herself from a heteronomous social order. Critical education contributes to
the subject’s emancipation and autonomy. Traditionally, the university is regar‐
ded as the central place where critical learning is taught and encouraged.
As we hope to demonstrate below, there are other and less politicized and biased
ways in which critical thinking can be understood and promoted in legal educa‐
tion that do more credit to the academic ideal of generating knowledge and
1 For an introduction to the ‘first wave’ of Critical Legal Studies, see Kelman 1987.
2 Bauman (1993, p. 8) suggests that this contradiction establishes ‘an aporetic situation’ – the con‐
tradiction between autonomous rational individuals (being able to choose between wrong and
right) and heteronymous rational management to prevent people choosing ‘wrong’. Skeptical
legal education, it is suggested here, takes issue with this aporetic situation.
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insight. As we will explain below, reflexivity plays an important role in our under‐
standing of critical thinking. Reflexivity not only refers to one’s own learning pro‐
cess but also to the social context of modernity in which learning takes places, as
described by social scholars such as Beck, Giddens & Lasch (1994).
In this article we intend to elucidate the role that critical thinking may play in
legal education, building on Oakeshott’s notion of liberal learning.3 Michael
Oakeshott belongs to the tradition of secular humanism that aims at initiating
students in a ‘great conversation’ which shapes them intellectually as well as
morally (Kronman 2007, p. 86-87). In The Voice of Liberal Learning (a collection of
essays published in 2001), Oakeshott characterizes learning as a strictly non-
instrumental activity. In schools and universities, knowledge is acquired for its
own sake. First, we will clarify Oakeshott’s notion of liberal learning (section 2).
Second, we will introduce the idea of skeptical legal education, which is to a large
extent based on Oakeshott’s understanding of liberal learning but which relativi‐
zes its insistence on the non-instrumentality of learning and reinforces its critical
potential (section 3). In addition, we will discuss the role that reflexivity plays in
skeptical legal education. Thirdly, an example of skeptical legal education in the
study of law will be presented (section 4). Finally, building on this example, we
will show the relevance of the suspension of judgment that skeptical legal educa‐
tion requires, for legal practice (section 5).
2 The art of conversation
According to Oakeshott (2001, p. 10), the human world is essentially a ‘place of
learning’. As an animal rationale man is involved in an on-going process of attribu‐
ting meaning to the world around him. By doing so, he creates a human world,
not because this world solely consists of human beings and all the things that
they produce, but primarily because it is a product of the human activity of signi‐
fying. Learning involves an unlimited semiosis: every attribution of meaning to
the world by man is temporary and incomplete. Learning does not follow a pre-
established plan and has no final destination. It is an adventure with an uncertain
and unpredictable outcome:
‘This engagement is an adventure in a precise sense. It has no preordained
course to follow: with every thought and action a human being lets go a moo‐
ring and puts out to sea a self-chosen but largely unforeseen course’ (Oakes‐
hott 2001, p. 11).
Throughout his whole life man is engaged in learning. Within this education per‐
manente schools and universities occupy a privileged position. Characteristic for
these educational organizations is, to begin with, that those involved are recogni‐
3 This article is a sequel to Van Klink (2013) in which a liberal and a critical view on education, as
presented by Oakeshott and Kennedy respectively, are compared more extensively. Some parts
of the current article are derived from this earlier article.
Recht en Methode in onderzoek en onderwijs 2013 (3) 2 7
Bart van Klink & Bald de Vries
zed and recognize themselves as learners, besides possible other roles they may
fulfil in society (such as musician, major or ‘meter maid’). Subsequently, learning
in educational organizations is focused on the learning of something specific. It
does not aim at promoting intellectual development, spiritual growth or the broa‐
dening of one’s horizon in general (these may be possible side effects), but at
acquiring knowledge about a particular subject, within a particular discipline, with
the help of the methods and conceptual tools typical for the discipline at hand.
The learner has to conceive of learning as a specific task, which requires atten‐
tion, patience and persistence. Finally, in schools and universities learning is not
an instrumental activity, but a goal in itself. Knowledge is acquired not only, or
not predominantly, for external purposes. Learning is an adventure, because the
route to follow and the destiny are always uncertain and may change in the pro‐
cess of acquiring knowledge. It takes place in a separated sphere, far away from
our daily cares and concerns. Therefore, Oakeshott (2001, p. 15) characterizes
learning as liberal, not in the political sense but in the existential sense of ‘libera‐
ted’ or ‘freed’: at least for a couple of years, learners do not have to worry too
much about ‘satisfying contingent wants’. What the university offers, is ‘the gift
of an interval’ (p. 114).
Oakeshott (2001, p. 69) describes education as a transaction between generati‐
ons, which aims at introducing newcomers to an ‘intellectual, imaginative, moral
and emotional inheritance’. The inheritance is shaped and reshaped in an on-
going conversation in which people are engaged in understanding themselves and
their world. In order to be able to participate in this conversation, learners have
to learn first to speak the language and to then recognize the different voices that
can be discerned within this language. Every academic discipline constitutes a lan‐
guage of its own, with its own rules, by means of which certain aspects of the
world and human existence can be expressed. It is the task of the teacher to teach
the students the rules of the language and to show how one can make one’s own
contribution to the on-going conversation. Liberal learning is an initiation in this
art of conversation.
According to Oakeshott, the ‘free’ conversation that takes place at universities
was threatened by various developments within the British educational system in
the 50s and 60s of the last century and modern society in general. Increasingly,
learning is transformed into some form of applied education. That means that edu‐
cation is used for socializing students and preparing them for certain tasks in
society. Instrumental learning replaces liberal learning and, as a consequence, tea‐
ching is reduced to the training of a series of technical functions for the sake of
some social purpose instead of knowledge acquisition for its own sake (cf. Oakes‐
hott 2001, p. 13). Nowadays, education is subjected increasingly to the logic of
economic reason as universities apply business models, based on output, effi‐
ciency and economic utility as benchmarks of quality (see Francot & De
Vries 2010). Due to these developments, schools and universities are no longer
free spaces of learning, where learners acquire knowledge mainly for its own sake.
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In modern universities there is an increasing tendency to reduce learning to skills
training. Oakeshott argues that education never coincides with the training of
specific techniques, not even in vocational education. In order to know how to do
something, one has to understand first what one is doing. In Oakeshott’s view,
knowledge contains two components: information and judgment. Information
consists of both facts (for instance about what statutes are and where they can be
found) and rules that prescribe how a specific skill (such as the interpretation of a
certain statute) has to be carried out. Judgment is the knowledge that makes it
possible to interpret information and to assess its relevance and, moreover, to
determine which rule has to be applied in a given case and which actions are
required by this rule. Without knowledge of this kind one would not be able to
learn a skill: ‘Before any concrete skill or ability can appear, information must be
partnered by “judgment,” “knowing how” must be added to the “knowing what” of
information’ (Oakeshott 2001, p. 49). A lawyer, for instance, needs to know more
than the content of the legal norms; s/he also must know when in a given case
which norm s/he has to apply and how that norm has to be interpreted in the
case at hand. This kind of knowledge cannot be expressed in rules or, in other
words, be translated into information. It gives us guidance in situations where
there are no specific rules or methods available or where we do not know which
rule or method to apply. Generally speaking, when we learn a language – whether
it is English or Spanish or the language of philosophy or the law’s language – it
does not suffice to learn the rules only. A competent speaker is someone who is
able to express himself or herself in a way that is not prescribed explicitly by the
rules. Judgment cannot be taught as such, because it cannot be made an indepen‐
dent object of study.4 The teacher transmits it implicitly when giving informa‐
tion: ‘It is implanted unobtrusively in the manner in which information is
conveyed, in a tone of voice, in the gesture which accompanies instruction, in
aside and oblique utterances, and by example’ (Oakeshott 2001, p. 60). Students
develop their faculty of judgment by recognizing and appreciating the individual
intelligence at work in the way in which the teacher thinks and speaks, in his or
her personal style and mode of expression.
In the past, nobody gave lessons in the art of conversation, but it had to be learnt
by listening to competent speakers engaged in conversation. There are no short‐
cuts for learning by way of simple techniques or ‘easy methods’ (Oakeshott 2001,
p. 179). Only by ‘submerging’ oneself in the practice of scholarship one can
become a fully-fledged participant in this practice.
3 Skeptical legal education
Following Oakeshott, we conceive of education an initiation in the art of conver‐
sation in which scholars of a certain discipline are engaged. This does not imply
that students have to be trained to be their master’s voice; on the contrary, they
4 Kronman (1993, p. 53ff) expresses a similar idea when he describes the lawyer as a lawyer-states‐
man who possesses of ‘practical wisdom’.
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have to develop their own voice. For that purpose, it is important to encourage
students to reflect critically and to develop their faculty of judgment. Being criti‐
cal is not the same as understanding society according to some pre-established
political scheme, as ‘crits’ like Duncan Kennedy assume. Critical thinking as pro‐
moted by Kennedy and others is one way of being critical, because it can make
students aware of power structures in education and society at large. However,
academic education is not a preparation for political activism. (In their private
lives, students may of course choose to do so.) Academic education teaches stu‐
dents not to embrace any kind of political ideology (either of a conservative or a
progressive strand), but instead to question and debunk it.5 The ‘critical’
approach to law advocated by Kennedy and others runs the risk of becoming in
itself dogmatic and not open to self-criticism.
However, what CLS rightfully point to is the contingent and contestable nature of
law: the question what law is (as a social construct), how it has to be founded and
how it is used in society, is not self-evident but open for critique and amendment.
Skeptical legal education is reflexive in the sense that it questions current assump‐
tions about what law is, how it functions in society and what or whose purposes it
serves. Reflexivity means that modern law calls for an understanding of modern
society and the processes of modernization that shape society. It refers to the
task of understanding processes of modernization, such as individualization, glo‐
balization, industrialization and secularization, in order to understand their
implications for the structure of contemporary society and its foundations, in
particular in politics and law (cf. Beck, Giddens & Lash 1994). Applied to legal
education, reflexivity asks for a skeptical attitude towards both the law and its
foundations such as the rule of law, causality, responsibility and so on, in order to
find out whether these foundations have to be reconsidered in the context of con‐
temporary society (De Vries 2013). In short: a reflexive approach aims at laying
bare the seemingly self-evident assumptions of (any) authoritative interpretation
of law and presupposes an intellectual position towards the study of law rather
than a particular political position as advocated by, for example, CLS. It exists in a
constant questioning of current assumptions about law, for the benefit of both
our knowledge of the law and its foundations and the intellectual development of
the student. In this sense, skeptical legal education differs from the positions
taken by Kronman (2007) and, more recently, by Nussbaum (2010). Kronman
defends an entirely non-instrumental view on education, in which learning con‐
tributes to self-understanding through the study of canonical texts.6 Nussbaum,
on the contrary, conceives of education as a tool for reinforcing citizenship with
democracy as a key notion (though not very well developed). Skeptical legal edu‐
cation serves no immediate political purposes nor is it part of an existentialist
quest for the meaning of life.
What matters is, that students learn to make their own assessment of the infor‐
mation that they receive from teachers while reading literature, listening to lectu‐
5 For a detailed critique on Kennedy’s view on critical legal education, see Van Klink 2013, p. #.
6 See, e.g., Kronman 2007, p. 261 (Appendix).
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res and engage in discussion. Students cannot and do not invent the standards of
evaluation from nowhere, but they have to build hermeneutically and critically on
the values that are already accepted within the community of legal scholars. In
this sense, it is critical towards the ‘enlightened’ notion of critique, developed by
Kant and others, where critique is seen as liberation from tradition and traditio‐
nal prejudices (see section 1). Whereas Carrington (2004, p. 149) conceives of
‘moral and intellectual autonomy’ as the ultimate goal of education, we would
prefer to speak of the moral and intellectual integrity to use one’s ‘own’ faculty of
judgment. The student’s autonomy is always related and relative to the intellec‐
tual environment in which s/he is raised. So it is a critical attitude that has to be
developed starting from an ‘uncritical’ (or self-evident) background of shared opi‐
nions and beliefs. This different sense of being critical is what we intend to cap‐
ture in our notion of skeptical legal education: knowledge claims should never be
taken for granted, but questioned and discussed from within the context of
accepted ideas handed down through particular academic traditions of thought.
The general aim of education is not to raise political awareness but intellectual
awareness: to feed epistemological doubt and uncertainty so that students learn
to assess knowledge claims critically. Hence, learning involves the responsibility
to reflect upon the knowledge gained – on its foundations and the social and poli‐
tical purposes it may serve. To reflect, for example, upon the question: What kind
of lawyer do I want to be? The answer to this question cannot be taught but only
learned – in an autonomous education setting in which learning for its own sake
is emphasized.
For the development of judgment in the context of legal education in particular
three conditions have to be met. These conditions which we will discuss below
concern (1) the student’s activity in and outside the classroom, (2) the manner in
which the teacher transfers knowledge and (3) the institutional context of the
faculty management respectively. We have derived them to a large extent from
Oakeshott’s notion of liberal learning as described above, but we have modified
them in some respects in order to make the learning process more (or more expli‐
citly) critical, more engaging and less ‘inward oriented’.7
To begin with, legal education should give more room for student participation in
courses. According to Oakeshott, students have to learn the language of a specific
discipline, so that one day they are able to generate new utterances in this lan‐
guage. However, Oakeshott adopts a rather hierarchical model of learning in
which the teacher transfers knowledge to the students. We suggest modifying
this model and adding more horizontal and interactive elements to it. In our
view, it is essential that students participate more actively in class than Oakes‐
hott acknowledges. One may learn a lot from reading texts and listening to com‐
petent speakers, but in order to master a language fully, one must be given regu‐
larly the opportunity to speak for oneself. This may be accomplished by means of
group discussions, presentations, moot courts and so on, and solely in classes of
7 These modifications follow from the imaginary encounter between the liberal and ‘critical’ view
on education, as described by Van Klink 2013, p. #.
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limited size. The cases discussed in law courses should give a representative over‐
view of the law as it is understood in legal doctrine and should encourage stu‐
dents to make their own assessment of it (without ‘politicizing’ the classroom as
advocated by Kennedy (1995 and 2004)). Furthermore, students should be
encouraged to continue their learning process outside the classroom through
various kinds of study-related extracurricular activities such as reading clubs,
online blogs, and student seminars. Teachers can stimulate this by facilitating
reading clubs, giving book suggestions or possibly by organizing such reading
clubs themselves. The ‘Law & Lounge’ experiment described below is an example
of the ‘horizontalization’ of learning. Moreover, students can get involved in
online activity, start discussions on relevant topics, and so on. As the university is
a community of both students and teachers, interaction does not need to stop at
the official class hours. Additionally, the faculty could invest in these extracurri‐
cular student-teachers activities by providing financial support and other facili‐
ties.
What is required, subsequently, is that law teachers convey information from a
detached point of view. That is, they should present the law as it is, as much as
possible independently from their own ethical and political preferences.8 This
descriptive, seemingly ‘neutral’ account of the law does not presuppose that
understanding law is in itself a neutral or value-free activity. On the contrary, law
teachers are required to present the law as it is and to expose the legal, moral and
political values on which the law (and their understanding of it) is based, however
without identifying themselves with these values. If they evaluate the current law
and give recommendations to amend it, they have to make clear that they are not
describing the law as it is at a certain moment in time but are expressing their
personal opinion about how the law ought to be in the future. Value judgments
are controversial in science, because their validity depends on the acceptance of
certain values and ultimately of a worldview (or an ideology in ‘critical’ terms)
whose truth can never be established by scientific means (cf. Weber 1989,
p. 25-26). So when teachers are evaluating the law, they should make clear on the
basis of which values they are reasoning, how they understand these values in the
given situation, and how their evaluation is connected to their general worldview.
In this respect a CLS approach may be useful as it helps to reveal moral and politi‐
cal choices that are involved in making law and teaching law, which traditional
legal education tend to ignore. However, political education should not amount to
political activism.9 As Max Weber (1989, p. 19) puts it: ‘politics has no place in
the lecture-room’. Instead he recommends that teachers offer examples of hypo‐
thetical reasoning: if one accepts a specific value (for instance, democracy), one
has to acknowledge certain rights as well (such as the freedom of speech), without
committing themselves (nor the students) to the acceptance of this value
(p. 25-26). Reasoning in such a way gives students the opportunity to arrive at a
8 This requires what Raz (1979, p. 158) calls ‘non-committed detached statements’: ‘Since one may
know what the law is without knowing if it is justified, there must be a possibility of making legal
statements not involving commitment to its justification.’
9 A powerful contemporary defence of this position can be found in Fish 2008.
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different assessment, building on different values, on a different understanding
of the same values, or on a different worldview. Similarly, law teachers should
explain and justify on the basis of what theoretical assumptions and what sources
they make factual assertions about the content of the law.
Knowledge is always fallible and disputable, when it comes to both normative and
factual statements. In order to give students a feeling for the fragility of know‐
ledge, it is important that teachers, in group discussions with students, take a
counter position against the communis opinio in the group at hand, question it and
demonstrate its ultimate groundlessness, as in Socratic dialogues.10 Inspired by
Socrates, ancient Greek skeptics such as Sextus Empiricus developed practices of
argumentative inquiry that are meant to expose internal contradictions within a
given position. As a result, the dispute remains undecided and one has to suspend
his/her judgment (epoche).11 ‘Skepsis’ means an inquiry or an examination guided
by reason and in search for truth, however in vain perhaps this search may be. In
the interim that the university offers interruptions have to be built in that halt
temporarily the creation of knowledge. Learning also involves the experience that
one does not know or does not know enough. In ancient skepticism, the suspen‐
sion of judgment served to attain a peaceful state of mind (ataraxia) so that one
no longer worries about truth and falsity anymore.12 In our view, the ultimate
goal of the infinite questioning is not tranquillity of mind but, on the contrary, an
increased awareness that knowledge is always a temporary and fallible construc‐
tion and that it has – as soon as it is accepted and becomes naturalized and fixed
as truth – a huge impact on our convictions and actions. In our modern age know‐
ledge acquired at universities is used more and more to intervene in society.13
Reflecting on the way knowledge shapes society, for better or worse, should the‐
refore be part of every education. Students have to learn that knowledge, in its
application, can be misinterpreted, distorted, even abused and has yet unknown
side effects.14
Finally, on the institutional level, the faculty management has to provide for a
mixture of teachers with different political, cultural, and religious backgrounds. If
they are exposed to a variety of opinions, students will soon discover that truth in
science is always a matter of debate. As Oakeshott argues, education is an intro‐
duction to a shared inheritance. However, the inheritance that is handed over
10 For an introduction to the Socratic method in legal education, see Areeda 1996.
11 Burnyeat (1983) gives an insightful description of the skeptical practice of inquiry.
12 In our view, skepticism does not necessarily involve the exclusion of emotions that Nussbaum
(1994) rejects in ancient and modern skepticism. On the contrary, these emotions can be part of
a critical inquiry, both as an object of inquiry (in order to understand which emotions sustain a
specific argument) and as a means of criticizing a certain position (when it contravenes signifi‐
cant emotions such as sympathy or love).
13 According to Giddens (1991, p. 123), the era of late modernity is characterized by ‘regular shifts
in knowledge-claims as mediated by expert systems’.
14 Weber (1989, p. 22) puts it as follows: ‘Anybody who is a reasonable teacher has as his first duty
to teach his students to acknowledge “inconvenient” facts, I mean facts which are inconvenient
for their party opinion.’
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from one generation to the other is not a fixed entity, but is changed in every
transmission.15 Every teacher will give his/her own version of the canonical texts,
depending on the theoretical perspective and worldview s/he has adopted. Not
one dominant voice should be heard, but a plurality of voices. This plurality of
voices will inevitably be a limited plurality, because not everyone will be allowed to
speak. In the selection of teachers not only academic requirements are applied
(teachers have to have the right qualifications), but also norms of decency (tea‐
chers have to meet some standard of good behaviour and political correctness).16
Kennedy (2004, p. 15) is undoubtedly right that the mainstream in law schools is
quite moderate. Generally speaking, law teachers are conservative in the sense
that they want to protect what they deem to be valuable in the law as it is. They
tend to resist radical change because they believe – for good reasons – that a legal
system can only function properly if the law is more or less stable and predictable.
However, within this mainstream many different (liberal, republican, conserva‐
tive, communitarian, feminist and other) positions can be discerned and, if one
listens carefully, one may even hear some radical and ‘critical’ tones. In order to
set the stage for a (by necessity limited) plurality of voices, the curriculum should
not only consist of courses where the ‘black letter law’ is taught, but also of cour‐
ses in which the law’s efficacy and legitimacy and its historical development can
be discussed on a more principled and theoretical level. This is the field of the so-
called ‘meta-juridical’ courses, such as legal sociology, legal theory, legal philoso‐
phy and legal history. Although they are doomed to remain in the periphery, as
Kennedy (2004, p. 36) notices rightfully, they are central for critical reflection on
the law as it is and how the law ought to be according to mainstream law teachers
who teach ‘black letter law’.
Skeptical legal education does not mean that law teachers have to reject the legal
system at hand, in part or in whole (nor do they have to embrace it wholehear‐
tedly). It means that they are asked to present their knowledge claims and value
judgments for what they are: fallible opinions which are debatable and have to be
debated within the community of both teachers and learners. This will improve
the students’ faculty of judgment and make them more critical towards people
who want to impose their worldview on them. So it appears that learning, after
all, does have an indirect instrumental value: namely to make students skeptical
towards any attempt to instrumentalize knowledge for dubious purposes and to
apply it in an uncritical manner.
4 Skeptical legal education in practice: the Law & Lounge experiment
As explained above, skeptical legal education requires active students and deta‐
ched teachers. An experiment, carried out at the Faculty of Law, University
15 This follows from Gadamer’s characterization of understanding as application (Gadamer 2006,
p. 305-308).
16 Universities will, for instance, not be inclined to give voice to teachers with overtly fascist sympa‐
thies.
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Utrecht, sought to bring into practice these requirements.17 The experiment
– colloquially called ‘Law & Lounge’ – was embedded in an introductory course of
law, mandatory to all first year students in the honours program. The introduc‐
tory course provides students with the foundations of Dutch modern law, addres‐
sing themes such as legality, the rule of law, justice, liberalism, equality and soli‐
darity, adjudication and interpretation. These themes are explained in textbooks
which students study at home in preparation for the class room sessions. In class,
the themes were reviewed on the basis of study questions and assignments.
The approach taken in the introductory course discourages students accessing the
primary sources (fundamental texts in legal philosophy, legal theory and socio‐
logy of law) and critically assessing their conceptual, moral and political presup‐
positions. The teacher focuses on knowledge transfer to the students through the
use of textbooks in which these primary sources are explained and summarized.
The teacher may teach the students ‘the rules of the language’ but he does not
show ‘how students can make their own contribution to the on-going conversa‐
tion’. This approach is defended with the idea, or so the argument goes, that first
year students would not be able to read and critically assess primary sources,
because they are deemed to be too difficult.
The Law & Lounge experiment sought to allow students to make their own con‐
tribution to the conversation, building upon two basic assumptions. The first
relates to difficulty. It is important that we confront students from the very start
of their academic career with primary sources, or fundamental texts that under‐
scores a broader understanding of law and legal concepts. It may well be that first
year students find these texts difficult and perhaps understand only part of the
theory presented in the texts at hand. We as teachers should not expect students
to understand the texts in the way we do – it took us time and effort as well to
fully understand them. Furthermore, students will read many such texts or at
least the themes these texts address (such as theories on power, legality, etc.)
repeatedly and over time their understanding of them will improve. The aim of
the experiment does not lie in explaining students how to fully understand such
texts, as if it were a course in exegesis, with the sole aim of reproduction of know‐
ledge. The aim is rather to awaken in students a critical potential and assess the
value of the theories presented in the selected texts and in the social context of
today’s world.18 It starts with exposing them to texts and confronting them with
what can be termed ‘intellectual uncertainty’. It expresses the idea that know‐
ledge must be gained, that it takes an effort and that it exists also in searching
one’s own thoughts for clues about what the text means and the learning purpo‐
ses it may serve. Research shows that if students are challenged in education,
their capacity to learn improves significantly (Scager et al. 2012).
17 This experiment was carried out by Bald de Vries, co-author of the present article.
18 This doesn’t mean that course in logic and argumentation is not essential in a law degree curricu‐
lum. The point is that it is more efficient to do one thing at a time.
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The other assumption relates more directly to the first two conditions that were
described above: the attitude of students and the position of the teacher. These
are communicating vessels: when a teacher puts herself at the centre of the lear‐
ning process, telling students what they must know, giving them the ‘right’ ans‐
wers, she creates a passive audience of students, who are merely encouraged to
process information and apply – unreflective – the trick of legal analysis exempli‐
fied by the case study method. White (1986, p. 156) already pointed, in a somew‐
hat caricature fashion, to the numbing experience of students of the case study
method: ‘a wonderfully exciting educational experience degenerates into a mecha‐
nical and empty ritual that robs it of almost every value, a transformation in
which both sides are complicitous.’ As White (1985, p. xiv) explains, the study and
practice of law is a creative act – ‘an art, a way of making something new out of
existing materials’. As a side effect, students may become aware that law is more
than ‘positivistic and rule-based’ (p. xii).
Is it possible that students ‘take over’ and are put in full control of the classroom
sessions, as a means to experience uncertainty, responsibility and creativity?
Pedagogically, this was the first aim of the Law & Lounge experiment. In their
very first semester, students experienced how it is to be a teacher, how it is to
take responsibility, as a group, for their own learning process. Second, conside‐
ring the contents of the course – studying and discussing basic texts about legal
concepts – the aim was for students to experience the confrontation with the
uncertainty of not-knowing (without resorting to authority (the teacher, as s/he
remained detached in a radical way), and to discover that this is part of the lear‐
ning process as a step to adopting a critical, skeptical attitude.
The experiment consisted of ten sessions that ran parallel to the ‘normal’ class
sessions and were offered to three groups of first year honours students, the
groups consisting of about 17-22 students. The sessions were made part of the
honours programme and they were in this sense mandatory. Students did not
receive a grade, nor was there a final exam or a paper to write. The reason for not
examining the students was to prevent any strategic behaviour focused upon gra‐
des. Each session lasted an hour. The preselected literature and one documentary
were linked, directly or indirectly to the themes of the course, including texts of
John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, James Boyd White and Oscar Wilde.19
All students were expected to read the texts in preparation for the class discus‐
sion. In addition, in each session a small group of about three students was res‐
ponsible to organize the session as they saw appropriate, and lead the discussion.
The role of the teachers was limited to that of an observer. They would, if asked,
discuss prior to a session with the students who were responsible for that session,
their ideas about how to organize the session and afterwards would give some
feedback on the chosen format. The teachers did not interfere with the content of
the discussions about the texts. No ‘right’ answers were given, nor did the tea‐
chers explain to students the essence of the texts. It was up to the students them‐
19 See Table A, below, for an overview.
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selves to figure that out, together during the group discussion. In general, the ses‐
sions had the following pattern: a brief introduction of the author, a short pre‐
sentation of the essence of the text, and a discussion based on a few theses for‐
mulated by the group responsible. Usually, these theses sought to link the text to
contemporary societal problems.
Upon completion of the course a number of (preliminary) observations can be
made.20 These relate to (1) the central pedagogical aim of students ‘taking over’,
(2) the format chosen by the students, (3) the critical potential (skeptical legal
education) together with (4) the role and position of the teacher in terms of the
selection of the texts and his scholarly assumptions and perspectives. In the last
two observations a link is established between the experiment and the concept of
skeptical legal education.
The use of self-organization (as a pedagogical tool) without ‘supervision’ is feasi‐
ble, when certain conditions are met. As said before, the students were honours
students, selected to take part in the honours degree program referred to as
Utrecht Law College. They are selected on the basis of past (school) results, moti‐
vation to learn, academic curiosity and societal interests. As the groups stay toge‐
ther from day one, they quickly get to know each other, creating together with
the teachers an ‘academic community’. It was obvious to them to come prepared
to class and to have an active attitude during class sessions. Indeed, research
shows that honours students score high in respect of intelligence, creative thin‐
king, openness to experience, desire to learn and a drive to excel (Scager et
al. 2011). The students took the experiment serious and took responsibility for
their learning process. (This is not to say that all students equally ‘liked’ reading
the texts and discussing them.) However, the task of organizing the individual
sessions by students remains a cause for concern. The chosen format and devel‐
oping pattern – that was not intervened with – caused students to study and dis‐
cuss the texts on a level that appeared too superficial. They felt that they were
being thrown into the deep without the tools to both read such basic texts and
discuss them. After each session, they felt uncertain about their efforts in under‐
standing the text and its essence. The experiment could be improved in this res‐
pect. However, the idea of intellectual uncertainty is considered to be a positive
effect in shaping an academic and critical attitude insofar this uncertainty trig‐
gers curiosity – the desire to find out. As the experiment progressed and students
found connections among the texts and between the texts and the ‘ordinary’
course sessions, students slowly started to understand (and accept) the value and
function of this uncertainty.
The idea of intellectual uncertainty connects the observations about the format
of the experiment with the observations relating to skeptical legal education and
the role and position of the teacher. Oakeshott referred to education as ‘the art of
conversation’. The experiment allowed students to engage with each other about
20 The experiment is currently subject to further (empirical) research by reference to educational
theories in respect of honours teaching, self-organization, grading and feedback.
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ideas, theories and concepts, found in the authoritative texts that underpin the
understanding of (positive) law. In doing so, students are put in a position to
develop their own critical view about law and its foundations, formulating ans‐
wers to the fundamental questions: What is law? What is its function? How to
recognize law? This view and these answers may be naïve at first but as students
are progressing in their studies their view on law does become more sophisticated
and academically sound. As far as the position of the teacher is concerned, the
experiment takes ‘detachment’ quite literally, in the sense that the teacher gives
over ‘control’ of the learning process. We would not promote, to be sure, this to
be a pedagogical Leitmotiv in the entire curriculum but to allow students (in the
shadow of the current approach in which the teacher is in control) to take over
does seem to inspire them. It makes them realize the responsibility they have, as
students, for their own learning process. The experiment presupposes a skeptical
attitude: the awareness that theories about, for example, power, equality, free‐
dom, punishment and so on are diverse and can be questioned. Questioning is
inquisitive – a means of learning and academic self-development. Questioning
(being critical) does not imply these theories are necessarily wrong, as if students
must express an opinion, but refers to ‘the suspension of judgment’. The next
step is to introduce the idea of reflexivity, as set out above, and to go a step furt‐
her. It exists in eventually making a judgment about law and its functioning in
contemporary society with an aim of continuous legal development and the need
for change.21
5 The suspension of judgment
Building upon the concept of liberal legal education, as espoused by Oakeshott,
we introduced the idea of skeptical legal education. Whereas Oakeshott stresses
the importance of the ‘interval’ – a non-instrumental moment of learning and
suspended judgment through the art of conversation –, we put moral and intellec‐
tual integrity in the centre of legal education. It refers to the requirement that
students feel responsible to use their own faculty of judgment when encouraged
to do so while studying and discussing legal texts. Skeptical legal education stres‐
ses the importance of conversation, discussion and suspended judgment and in
doing so it promotes the students’ critical potential. A skeptical attitude starts
with the intellectual awareness that knowledge claims cannot be taken for gran‐
ted but must continuously be questioned in order to properly understand and use
them in a critical way, and to do so from a detached point of view rather than on
the basis of a particular political ideology. After they are graduated, lawyers can
use their skeptical attitude to contribute in a critical way to the development of
law. After all, legal education is to a large extent oriented towards legal practice
and those who we teach will shape legal practice.
Skeptical legal education poses a challenge to legal education, its teachers and stu‐
dents as well as the organization of law faculties. The experiment illustrated how
21 In the future this element will be added to the experiment.
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we can give shape to skeptical legal education but, obviously, skeptical legal edu‐
cation is not limited to this example. What the example shows is that learning
and teaching must be a collective activity where learners and teachers each can
have their responsibilities, which law faculties must be able to provide and facili‐
tate. It may be that skeptical legal education fits well at first sight within the so-
called meta-juridical courses in the field of, for example, legal philosophy or the
sociology of law, but it is not necessarily restricted to these kind of courses. At
each level and in each course skepticism is required to understand law as it is and
why it is as it is. It is only then that students can draw their own conclusions
about the law and its meanings and operations and how the law as it is can or has
to be changed, in the awareness that these conclusions are temporary and questi‐
onable. Skeptical legal education also allows them to raise questions about their
role as a lawyer: What type of lawyer do I want to be? How do I shape my career as
a lawyer? Questions that equally apply to us teachers: What are our moral and
political values? How do I want the law to be and why? What kind of law teacher
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Supplement Table A
Course themes: Selected texts:22
1. Legitimacy of power Locke, Second Treatise (excerpts)
2. Sovereignty Hobbes, The Leviathan (excerpts)
3. Research methodology Siems, ‘Legal Originality’
4. Fair trial/authority Documentary: ‘The Millgram Experiment’
5. Judicial autonomy Wiarda, Drie typen van rechtsvinding (excerpts)
6. Law and sociology Schwartz, ‘Social factors in the Development of Legal Control’
7. Justice Wissenburg, ‘Aristoteles over rechtvaardigheid’
8. Liberty Mill, On Liberty
9. Equality and solidarity Wilde, ‘The Soul of Men under Socialism’
10. Legal education James Boyd White, ‘Doctrine in a Vacuum’23
22 Full references are available upon request.
23 The last session deviated from the course theme and instead concluded with a discussion on legal
education.
22 Full references are available upon request.
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1 Introduction
1.1 General starting points
Labelling academic education as an independent objective, as if it could be separa‐
ted from academic education as such, is a misunderstanding. By this I mean that
this type of education must be integrated in the courses that are part of the aca‐
demic curriculum. Education can only be deemed academic in nature if this is
exclusively the case. This means that the education must be focussed on making
the students understand how a theory which is expressed in a subject comes into
being, and how this can be reflected, added to, extended and improved. For bre‐
vity’s sake we refer to this as theory development.
I interpret theory, following De Groot, as a system of logically related and, in par‐
ticular, compatible assertions, views and definitions concerning a reality field,
which has been formulated in such a manner that verifiable hypotheses can be
deduced from it (De Groot 1969). A theory makes connections between observati‐
ons.
The above statement does require some qualifications. There are subjects which
form part of the core of a course, and subjects which have a supporting and gene‐
rally exploratory function. Consider hereby, for example, subjects such as statis‐
tics or mathematics, which teach specific techniques that are necessary in order
to be able to conduct the research for the purpose of theory development in the
core courses. In these subjects the intention is not to teach theory development;
that takes place in other courses.
Theoretical knowledge is (ultimately) intended for the purpose of ordering obser‐
vations. This knowledge is checked against reality and therefore also applicable to
this reality. In other words: theoretical scientific research (virtually) always goes
hand in hand with practical application, if not right away, then within a foreseea‐
ble period and sometimes in a manner which cannot be predicted. As will be
described, students learn the skill of conducting scientific research on the basis of
the practical application of scientific knowledge. In almost all scientific courses,
therefore, a dual result emerges, meaning that students on the one hand have the
(initial) skill of being able to conduct scientific research, while on the other hand
they are also able to apply scientific knowledge. It is known that this is also the
case for legal courses.
1.2 Problem definition and research objective
In legal courses there are a number of central subjects within which the concepts
developed in various areas of law – private law, public and administrative law, and
22 Recht en Methode in onderzoek en onderwijs 2013 (3) 2
Legal Dogmatics and Academic Education
criminal law – are studied in their mutual cohesion and application. We refer to
these subjects as dogmatic. We can refer to the entirety of the systematically
ordered concepts as dogmatic legal theory. This theory has a long tradition, but
contemporary Dutch dogmatic legal theory is without a doubt strongly influenced
by the work of nineteenth-century German lawyers, sometimes referred to under
the name ‘Rechtswissenschaft’ (Legal Science). Although the practitioners of Ger‐
man dogmatic legal theory therefore spoke of science, it is not always clear what
its subject and method was (Reimann 1990).
It is remarkable that, within Dutch dogmatic legal science, this is still the case.1 It
is therefore all the more remarkable that law students are still being instructed in
drafting dogmatic theory. One may presume that making the methods of dogma‐
tic legal science more explicit was never considered necessary because they are
implicitly included in the manner in which education is provided within the dog‐
matic subjects. This is further suggested by the fact that, within the dogmatically
tinted legal investigations, there is hardly any account of the methods used. In
legal science a personal narrative manner has developed on the basis of tradition,
whereby the research results are presented. Tijssen (2009) refers to this in his dis‐
sertation, following Voermans, as ‘following elephant paths’.
Previously I developed a model whereby the evolution of dogmatic legal theory
design can be made more explicit.2 This concerns, amongst other aspects, the
application of the empirical cycle constructed by De Groot, which forms the final
element of an evolution of the application of mundane knowledge to theory
design. The ideas of De Groot are widely accepted and used by social scientists.
The starting point of the article before you is that this evolution must be ‘repea‐
ted’ during an academic study in empirical subjects. My objective is to investigate
how this is done in the legal dogmatic education. Until now this growth from
mundane knowledge to theory design is implicit. A lot can be said for making the
several steps to be taken more explicit, because it would make the course toward
theory design run more efficient. Many matters which now remain implicit could
be denominated and discussed in the interaction between lecturer and students.
Furthermore, cooperation with other scientific areas can be greatly improved if a
connection is sought to generally accepted methodological starting points.
1.4 Structure
In section 2 I will provide a short overview of the ideas of De Groot regarding the
evolution of mundane knowledge into theory design. During academic study a
student must take various steps in order to complete this evolution. In section 3
I will develop a general model by which these steps and their content can be
1 See for example Peczenik, Lindahl and Van Roermond 1983. At the beginning of this century a
heated and comprehensive discussion was conducted about this subject in the Netherlands,
which has not resulted in unanimity.
2 Struiksma 2012. Also available on http://hdl.handle.net/1871/38649 and http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2168660 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2168660 (Struiksma 2012). For a better
understanding of the article before you, reading of this publication is recommended.
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understood. Section 4 contains an analysis of the specific characteristics of legal
dogmatic theory design, on the basis of the model referred to earlier on (Tijs‐
sen 2009). In section 5 the steps, described in section 3, will be applied to the
legal science course. Section 6 will contain a conclusion.
2 The empirical cycle
De Groot has described how the development from mundane thinking processes
to the scientific approach should be imagined. Man can reflect on the process
whereby he gains experience. He is aware of a specified objective which he keeps
in mind, of the resources which he uses, the choices which he makes within that
context, and the effects which specific resources produce with a focus on the
objective to be achieved. An evaluation therefore takes place, whereby the effecti‐
veness of the resource in relation to the objective can be recorded. The result of
the evaluation can be stored in his memory to be used at the next opportunity.
Man is aware of his presumption of cohesion within reality, of expectations with
regard to the effect of his responses to this reality and of the fact that he tests
these expectations through his response. There is therefore a cycle of psychologi‐
cal processes which support and influence this interaction with reality. De Groot
refers to this cycle as an empirical cycle within thought processes and describes
this as follows (De Groot 1969, p. 6):
observation-supposition-expectation-testing-evaluation
Because man is aware of the manner in which actually occurring problem questi‐
ons can be solved, he can also define those solutions separately from the problem
questions. He no longer responds only to practical problems, but also defines the‐
oretical problems. This is referred to as a ‘shift from end to means’ (De
Groot 1969, p. 7).
I will provide an example here. During the developmental history of humanity,
farmers have quickly gained experience with regard to types of crops, signs of
change in the weather and the consequences of seasons. They gained this practi‐
cal knowledge by making decisions about times for sowing and harvesting. That
seasons change is a fact of common knowledge. Even in the early history of man‐
kind, this fact was not just accepted, but people also sought explanations. There
was soon a shift from end to means: the knowledge (the changing of the seasons)
whereby a problem (decision on sowing and harvesting) could be solved, was defi‐
ned as a problem. At first, the explanations were sought in the supernatural, but
subsequently – after the necessary theoretical interim steps – people realized that
the trajectory of the earth around the sun, and the tilting of earth’s axis in rela‐
tion to its trajectory, formed an adequate solution to the problem. Furthermore, a
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theory was formed that was not limited to decisions that can be substantiated in
the context of agricultural operations.3
According to De Groot there are cycles for the various stages of abstraction of the
experience from reality and reflection on the knowledge gained. For the most
abstract forms of the cycle he refers to the thinking subject: he gains real expe‐
rience from the outside world, he becomes aware by reflection that he does so, he
defines the finding of resources as a problem and seeks to solve that problem, he
carries out part of this mentally with the focus on complex, abstract objectives set
by culture, possibly with the aid of specific or abstract models of the part of the
‘world’ it concerns – and whereby the subject ultimately will enter into consulta‐
tion with others about his process of experience (De Groot 1969, p. 17).
The reasoning followed and the research conducted must be presented for the
purpose of communication. This implies that the thinking and research method
used, and the results found, must be represented in such a formalized manner
that the ‘forum members’ can follow the reasoning. This does not only set requi‐
rements for the manner in which the cycle is presented, but also for the way in
which the reasoning and the results are worded. These must, as it were, be ‘stan‐
dardized’ or, if new, be brought in line with wording which is already standardi‐
zed. Science strives for explicit, transferable knowledge (De Groot 1969, p. 19).
De Groot has referred to the process of theory development as the scientific
empirical cycle, whereby he makes a distinction in the following five stages
(p. 28):
1. Observation: collating and grouping of facts material.
2. Induction: formulating of hypotheses.
3. Deduction: deducing special consequences from the hypotheses in the form
of verifiable predictions.
4. Testing of the hypotheses against the realization, or otherwise, of predictions
in new empirical material.
5. Evaluation of the result of the testing.
3 Course for theory design in general
When a student starts an academic course he will, as it were, find himself in the
situation in which our predecessors found themselves at the time that scientific
development had yet to start. He must, in a limited time, repeat an evolution of
the application of the mundane, practical knowledge to theory design, with which
others have potentially been occupied for centuries. However, there is a diffe‐
rence: the scientific knowledge is present in a condensed form and the core of this
can be transferred in a relatively short time. Somewhere in that short time the
student will have to make a shift from end to means.
3 Example derived from Deutsch 2012, p. 24.
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Firstly, a student will have to become aware of connections in the relevant reality
area and of the existence of scientific theories with which those connections are
described. It must become clear to him that there are elements in the relevant
reality area for the course to which the theory can be applied. Not all elements are
relevant, and he will therefore have to make a selection in the light of the theory.
The problem is therefore that he must know the theory in order to be able to
select the relevant aspects, while he must learn to apply the theory on the basis of
the relevant aspects. This impediment can be overcome by the lecturer dealing
with problem questions to which the theory can be applied. In the course of this
he will demonstrate what the relevant aspects of the problem question are, as
well as why they are relevant, i.e., in the light of the theory. The lecturer acts as a
role model, namely as an expert. An expert has such extensive knowledge of the‐
ory and practice that he intuitively senses, in many cases, which theory must be
used in a given case. However, education and experience are the basis of this
knowledge and intuition. The lecturer must be aware that this knowledge and
intuition cannot be transferred just like that, but that it primarily concerns the
teaching of the reasoning process. He must be able to imagine himself in the posi‐
tion of an ignorant person. He must therefore start with simple applications,
whereby the applicable theory can be found immediately by the simple selection
of not too many relevant observation aspects. Subsequently, the degree of diffi‐
culty can be increased by offering a number of possibly applicable theories and to
have the number and complexity of the observation aspects increased. The stu‐
dent now has to make choices, on the theoretical as well as observational side, in
the course of which he will subconsciously follow a mental empirical cycle with
reflection referred to by De Groot (1969, p. 12). There is an objective (the finding
of an applicable theory) which is a problem for the student. There is a certain free‐
dom during the choosing of applicable theories, and there is also uncertainty about
the question of which theories will be most applicable. The student makes a ten‐
tative choice, applies the theory, by trying, to the aspects concerned and verifies by
assessing if the chosen theory can connect those aspects sufficiently. If not, then
a new theory can be chosen, or the choice of the relevant aspects can be changed.
Subsequently, the cycle will be repeated, until the required result has been achie‐
ved. To reinforce the learning process, a lecturer must check the steps followed by
a student, and if necessary improve them or provide an example. Unfortunately
we have noted that this, given the large scale of most courses, is not always possi‐
ble.
Gradually the student becomes familiar with theories by applying them deducti‐
vely to problem questions. To do so it is always necessary to apply a theory to the
correct aspects of a problem question. By coming into contact with a large num‐
ber of problems, he learns to see that problems are comparable, in the sense that
they have similar aspects which can, by induction, all be brought under a specified
theory. This often appears in the following form: problem question A looks like
problem question B. Theory X is applicable to problem question B; let us see if X
can also be applied to A. This is, of course, no problem if the aspects of A and B
can be generalized in the same manner, but if this is not the case, then this does
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not mean that X has to be unusable. It can possibly be adjusted in the sense that
it retains its general working method, but works for a number of special cases. At
that time there is theory development, which can be demonstrated within educa‐
tion after some time, for example after the core doctrines of a subject have been
taught. At that time the student has learned that the characteristic of a theory is
that it describes a connection between a large number of cases. In the beginning
the student sees the application in one case, and by consistently bringing cases
under the theory, similarities in the cases will become apparent. At that time it
can dawn on the student that the theory is made from the similarities of the
cases, while the test is always if the next case also falls under it.
In summary, the student first learns to generalize the aspects from the particular
details of the case which can fall under a theory, and to verify the applicability of
that theory by means of deduction. There is a tacit assumption thereby that a the‐
ory can be found which will be applicable to all comparable cases now and in the
future.4 Subsequently, the student learns to generalize comparable cases to form
the theory in the course of which the objective changes. The problem is no longer
finding an already existing theory which is applicable to a specific case, but to
form a new theory or to adjust an existing theory in such a manner that it will be
applicable to many cases. It does not concern the practical application of a theory
as an objective, rather the theory design is the objective.
The manner of reasoning to be followed during theory design must be imprinted
step by step. On the basis of studying and internalizing examples, the student is
guided to personal theory design. The guiding principle thereby is that, primarily,
the presence of a theory is given together with the representation of a limited
number of observations which do not, at a glance, fall under the working of the
theory. Let us call these observations problematic observations. The assignment
is to adjust or extend the theory in such a manner that the problematic observati‐
ons can be brought under the working of the theory. In the beginning the assign‐
ments will be simple. Later on the assignments can be more difficult, in the sense
that a theory to be adjusted does exist, but must be found by the student himself.
Furthermore, it cannot be clear from this theory that it is applicable. It is also
possible that the theory is in parts internally contradictory. The degree of diffi‐
culty can be increased by presenting a larger number of problematic cases, of
which it is furthermore not immediately clear what the connecting factor in their
problematic character is. However, what these assignments do have in common is
the fact that the theory must be described, including the relevant published lite‐
rature, from which possible solution directions can be derived. After this an ana‐
lysis will be made of which observations or parts of the theory are problematic
and why this is the case. The analysis will result in induction of the similar
aspects of the problematic observations and parts and a presumption of the man‐
ner in which the theory must be adjusted so as to be applicable. After adjustment,
the theory will be applied in a deductive manner to the problematic observations,
4 Of course we know that the induction principle is not tenable from a formal point of view, but in
practice it is indispensable.
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but, for the purpose of verification of the integrity of the theory, also to the previ‐
ous non-problematic observations. This application can provide various outco‐
mes: (1) after application the theory works without difficulty, (2) the application
solves the problems only partially, (3) the application causes new problems. In the
latter cases the similar aspects of the problematic observations will be again indu‐
ced until there is a presumption of solution.
Ultimately some students will reach a level which enables them to not only inde‐
pendently adjust existing theories, but also to form new theories and to conduct
research of a large extent and scope. This level is required to be able to complete a
doctoral thesis.
It goes without saying that the student acquires competence in scientific reaso‐
ning methods while at the same time mastering the rules for proper scientific
reporting procedures.
The steps students go through in the course for theory design can be summarized
as follows, on the basis of the previous section.
1. Initiation by practical applications
A student must become aware of the existence of scientific theories and their
workings. For this purpose he discovers that there are elements in the reality area
relevant to the course to which the theory can be applied. Not all elements are
relevant, and that is why he must form a selection in light of the theory. The pro‐
blem is therefore that he must know the theory in order to be able to select the
relevant aspects, while he must learn to apply the theory on the basis of the rele‐
vant aspects. This problem will be overcome because the lecturer deals with
simple examples, whereby he shows what the relevant aspects in the problem
question are and also why they are relevant, i.e., in light of the application of the
theory.
2. Deepening by practical application
The degree of difficulty of the practical application will be increased by offering a
larger number of possibly applicable theories and to have the number and com‐
plexity of the observation aspects increased. Now the student must make choices,
on the theoretical side as well as on the observational side. He thereby follows a
mental empirical cycle.
3. Recognition of theory development
By solving a larger number of problem questions with the aid of a theory, a stu‐
dent learns to see that problem questions are comparable, in the sense that they
have similar aspects which can, through a cycle of induction and deduction,
always be brought again under a specified given theory. The student breaks free
from the practical application of a theory and makes the shift from end to means.
He realizes that a theory, by means of induction and deduction, can be formed
from problem questions.
28 Recht en Methode in onderzoek en onderwijs 2013 (3) 2
Legal Dogmatics and Academic Education
4. Initiation into theory development
The student takes the first steps while going through of the scientific empirical
cycle. The assignments are simple, in the sense that quite a lot of details are
handed out ready-made. Through examples the student learns the application of
methods relevant to the various stages of the cycle.
5. Deepening of theory development
The student takes further steps. The assignments are more complex; gradually
fewer details are handed out.
6. Independent theory development
The student formulates, if necessary with some directions, a personal definition
of a problem and research hypothesis and independently goes through the scien‐
tific empirical cycle. However, the extent and scope of the research are limited. If
that limitation is removed we are talking about research for the purpose of a doc‐
toral thesis.
4 Legal science theory design
Somewhere in the history of the development of law, perhaps even at different
times, the shift was made from end to means. Law was primarily seen as being of
supernatural origin; much later awareness appeared that law is made by humans.
The basic material in dogmatic legal science comprises the concepts through
which relations and conduct are indicated, and the accompanying definitions
(Struiksma 2012, p. 12ff). These concepts are not directly derived from reality,
but from the representation of this reality in the form of judgements that were
and are delivered for the resolution of disputes. The disputes are the empirical
material of the science. The definitions function in rules intended to influence
conduct and which are applied to resolve disputes. Relations and conduct, as they
have actually occurred, are transformed in dispute resolution through the classifi‐
cation of facts and circumstances into concepts from which the rules are con‐
structed, as a result of which those rules can be applied to the dispute to be resol‐
ved.
Through centuries of (still on-going) development, the concepts are provided
with definitions by science in the form of an inductive/deductive process, by stu‐
dying the manner in which they are applied in the resolution of disputes. They
have therefore arisen from the practice of dispute resolution. Subsequently these
concepts have also again been placed in increasingly large collections of concepts.
Especially through the fact that science provides concepts with a uniform descrip‐
tion, it is possible for these concepts to acquire a general working in the form of
regulations.
The sources from which the theoretical body of concepts is added to, and against
which they are verified, increase in extent and number during the development of
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the law and legal science. It no longer concerns merely the judgements, but also
the commentaries. In these commentaries the meaning of a judgement, and more
particularly the meaning of a specified concept is discussed in light of a specified
doctrine. Does the judgement fit within that doctrine, or is this not the case? On
the basis of such discussion all sorts of follow-up questions can be posed, such as:
Was this a rarity? Was it just about an error? Does this provide a new opening?
And if so, what does this mean for the system of a doctrine?
Furthermore, the meaning of a specified concept, or at least the start of this, is
(also) derived from the explanation of that concept which the regulator has provi‐
ded in the context of the formation of rules.
The body of concepts is described and subdivided into doctrines in manuals, text‐
books and monographs. They are indispensable in the search for differences of
opinion and knowledge gaps, i.e., to formulate research hypotheses. Furthermore,
there are dissertations in which the results of new research are presented. Alt‐
hough such research relates to a manageable research topic, the design is broad,
in the sense that an extensive exploration of the state of affairs takes place, follo‐
wing which the research topic can be verified against a broad range of sources. In
addition there are publications in magazines in which results from research are
presented. Research publications can serve as the starting point for follow-up
research.
In all this the judgements remain the most important source. Ultimately all judge‐
ments which are delivered about definitions and their cohesion are verified
against the manner in which concepts are actually applied. Whatever meaning sci‐
entists, regulators or advisors give to definitions, it is ultimately the adjudicator
who determines the final meaning, although this takes place in an indirect man‐
ner (Struiksma 2012, section 17ff).
In recent years pure dogmatic research has reduced in numbers. Annotations are
being made and the manuals are kept up to date, but dissertation topics are incre‐
asingly interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary in nature (composite research).
One could therefore argue that the course in theory design, especially with regard
to the education of research methods, must be more focussed on the fields that
are relevant for the composite research.5 This appears to be correct, but we must
not lose sight of the fact that the maximum amount of credits to be achieved in
the academic studies are fixed and that, in any case, plenty of attention must be
paid to the dogmatic subjects, because they are required in the context of the ‘civil
effect’ (a master’s degree with ‘civil effect’ is a condition for admission to the legal
professions or judiciary). Furthermore, it is necessary to maintain the skill of dog‐
matic theory design, because if this were to be lost in the times to come, the tena‐
bility of positive law would be affected from the inside and composite research
would also no longer be possible.
5 See, e.g., Van Gestel, Giesen & Van Boom 2012.
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5 The course in legal science theory design
Through the courses in dogmatic subjects, the steps described above in the devel‐
opment of legal science must again be gone through in a condensed form: from
learning the application of rules to cases, to the forming, maintaining and syste‐
matizing of the concepts by which those rules are formed. A problem is that the
students, at least to my knowledge, are not being taught that it concerns a scien‐
tific theory in the body of concepts. They are traditionally taught the meaning of
concepts in the form of solving a case, whereby the impression arises that the
only objective is to learn to apply rules. They therefore do not apply at first sight a
theory, but instead rules with which disputes can be solved. Indeed, rules are not
in themselves a theory, but the rules are formed by concepts which are derived in
a scientific manner from practice. One tends to argue that this is a study focussed
on practice. However, to learn to apply rules is only a means to teach students the
meaning of concepts in their mutual cohesion, a necessary condition to be able to
make the step toward theory design. I think that in the current curricula not
enough specific attention is paid to this.
1. Initiation by practical application
The student must become aware of the existence of scientific theories and the
working thereof. For this purpose he discovers that there are elements in the rea‐
lity area relevant for the course to which the theory can be applied. Not all ele‐
ments are relevant, and that is why he must reach a selection in light of the the‐
ory.
The student will be handed simple legal cases and the lecturer provides an exam‐
ple, from the facts and circumstances of which a selection must be made, and in
which manner this must be translated into concepts to be able to apply a legal
rule with which the dispute processed in the case can be solved. The student
learns about variants which can be solved in a comparable manner, as well as on
the basis of the example case from the law of precedent. The student learns the
definitions and their application on the basis of a textbook or manual. A start is
made on the teaching of the mutual connection of the concepts.
2. Deepening by practical application
The degree of difficulty of the practical application will be increased by offering a
larger number of possibly applicable parts of the theories and by increasing the
number and complexity of the observation aspects. Now the student must make
choices, on the theoretical side as well as on the observational side.
The student gets handed more complex cases in which it is not immediately clear
how facts and circumstances must be classified in light of a specified part of the
theory. Depending on the classification, various parts of the theory are applicable.
There is not only one answer which is correct at face value. Various sources must
be studied and compared in order to obtain a proper view of the meaning of con‐
cepts.
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3. Recognition of theory design
By solving a large number of problem questions with the aid of a theory, a stu‐
dent learns to see that problem questions are comparable, in the sense that they
have similar aspects which can, through a cycle of induction and deduction,
always be brought under a specified given theory. The student breaks free from
the practical application of a theory and makes the shift from end to means. He
realizes that a theory, by means of induction and deduction, can be formed from
problem questions.
In the application of law to more difficult cases it often concerns demonstrating
that a rule can be applied by showing that the rule has also been applied in a com‐
parable case. Of course, for this it must first be made plausible that it does indeed
concern a comparable case. Viewed in that light the student must be able to inter‐
pret the meaning of the concept (as part of the rule) to be applied on the basis of
as many sources as possible. Subsequently he must demonstrate that the relevant
facts and circumstances of the case under consideration and the example case can
be brought under the concept in the same manner, possibly by first varying the
meaning of the definition within certain, but responsible, margins by following
an interpretation method.6 During this process, theory design takes place in a
certain sense, because the meaning of a concept must be tentatively adjusted. So
there is formation of a hypothesis, albeit in the context of a practically focussed
application. Still, the emphasis is beginning to shift to the theory, because a hypo‐
thetical adjustment does not only have to be verified in practice, but also in the‐
ory. Since an adjustment is not possible if the cohesion with related concepts is
affected, and also not without the earlier application if the concept is corrupted.
Also, possible future applications of the concept can be tried out on the basis of
imaginary cases. In this manner the student will become more familiar, while sol‐
ving difficult cases, with the requirements which the theoretical system sets for
practical applications. He makes the shift from end to means, but this jump is not
marked in the course and is also not recognized by many students. It is a gradual
process, which is faster for one student than for another.
4. Initiation into theory design
The student takes the first steps while going through the scientific empirical
cycle. The assignments are simple, in the sense that quite a lot of details are
handed out ready-made.
One could argue that the usual bachelor’s thesis is the embodiment of this stage.
One problem is that the following of the cycle cannot be demonstrated on the
basis of examples that are used until now. The examples that exist consist of clas‐
sical, narrative, legal science literature. It is not easy for students to translate
these examples into their own hesitant ideas. Furthermore, it cannot be expected
from these students that they set up and work out a complete research project. It
is more obvious that they will limit their efforts to exploration, description of a
6 See for a splendid example of a teaching method based on this approach Rozemond 2006.
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definition of a problem and the formulation of a tentative research hypothesis,
and that they describe and apply the accompanying research methods. However,
there are no such examples, nor a statement of the methods relevant to legal sci‐
ence research. That many bachelor’s theses are still brought to a good conclusion
may be due to the fact that students have come to recognize theory design intuiti‐
vely. They can translate this intuition with a bit of effort through solid guidance,
in an exploration research project, which subsequently must be put into words in
the classical manner. It is important to notice that the scope of the bachelor’s the‐
sis is limited in such a manner that a complete research is simply not possible.
5 and 6. Deepening of theory design and independent theory design
The student takes further steps. The assignments are more complex; gradually
fewer details are handed out. Ultimately the student formulates, if necessary with
some direction, a personal definition of a problem and a research hypothesis and
independently goes through the scientific empirical cycle. However, the extent
and scope of the research are limited.
One could argue that this stage must be gone through in the master’s degree pro‐
gramme, which ultimately has to be completed with a master’s thesis. The
master’s thesis can be placed under independent theory development.
So a bridge must be built between bachelor and master’s thesis. As far as I am
aware, this is not the case in Dutch master degree programmes. In the master
stage there is a deepening in a specified area of law, a number of optional subjects
are followed and the degree programme is concluded with a master’s thesis. The
bachelor’s thesis contains the exploratory and descriptive part of limited legal sci‐
ence research. In continuation of this the provisional research hypothesis could
be verified against research material. This approach would assume that students
would choose a master variant which connects well to the bachelor’s thesis. That
is not necessarily the case. So there must be another manner provided for a conti‐
nued theoretical development. The solution could be found by offering students,
in the context of their deepening, a research hypothesis which they then must
verify against research material (partially to be found by themselves). For this
part, a separate skills subject could also be introduced. It should be noted that
space could also be made for this approach in the optional subjects.
6 Concluding remarks
The objective of this article was to investigate how the evolution of the applica‐
tion of mundane knowledge to theory design is ‘emulated’ in the legal dogmatic
education. To do so, I used the ideas of De Groot as developed in his book Metho‐
dology and some theoretical insights that I laid down in The dispute as pivot. My
investigations resulted in a model consisting of six steps: initiation by practical
applications; deepening by practical application; recognition of theory design; ini‐
tiation into theory design; deepening of theory design and independent theory
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design. These steps can be traced down in the legal dogmatic education and
should be made more visible in the education programme.
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Halfway through the year of postgraduate studies that is required for the LLM at
Queen’s University Belfast, I give a talk to the students, entitled ‘Asking the Right
Questions: Understanding Methodology’. It is not always particularly well recei‐
ved. On one occasion I was approached by a student afterward, who commented,
‘All that “how questions” stuff confused the hell out of me. You should really
think about whether we need to know that. Oh, and don’t talk about Foucault!’ In
direct resistance to this comment, let me begin this article with a quotation from
Foucault’s essay ‘What is Critique’, where he describes the art of critique as ‘a
certain way of thinking, speaking and acting, a certain relationship to what exists, to
what one knows, to what one does, a relationship to society, to culture and also a
relationship to others, that we would call, let’s say, the critical attitude’ (Fou‐
cault 1997, p. 24). These are features of methodology – that is, of how to think
(speak and act) a project. And so had this student engaged with my talk she might
have seen that this is precisely the crucial importance of understanding methodo‐
logy and being able to define it: it is your approach, your perspective, your atti‐
tude; it is, essentially, how you think. Thus it is about asking ‘the right questions’
for you, for your project and what interestsyou and these are ‘how’ questions. The
‘how’ question examines how meanings are produced and attached to various
social subjects and objects, thus, as Roxanne Lyn Doty explains, ‘constituting par‐
ticular interpretative dispositions that create certain possibilities and preclude
others’ (Doty 1996, p. 4). It influences the research questions that you ask and it
challenges assumptions. It determines, in other words, your ‘critical attitude’.
This article stresses the importance and possibility of training the critical atti‐
tude. It suggests that the critical attitude, or what Foucault also calls ‘critique’, are
characteristics of methodology – that is, of how to think a project. It is crucial
that as researchers we are able to articulate our methodologies. It is also crucial
that as educators, we can teach our students why they need to articulate the way
in which they think. Can we therefore teach, the article asks, critical legal educa‐
tion? I suggest here that the way to do this is to market methodology as a
‘skill’ – and to thereby free it to some extent from what both students and
researchers in Law often view as the negative connotations of ‘theory’.
I begin by addressing the issue of why it is difficult to teach critical legal educa‐
tion. It is necessary then to tackle questions of how to define (alternative) metho‐
dology – and how exactly it is different from ‘theory’ and indeed from ‘method’.
The second section of the article then presents the need to market methodology
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as a ‘skill’ to our law students – as a ‘transferrable’ skill that translates to the prac‐
tical workplace and also as a means of seeing alternative truths in the practice and
understanding of law and society. It discusses this as a way of hopefully produ‐
cing a student that is not docile and disengaged (despite being, nevertheless, a
successful lawyer) but, rather, is able to nurture an attitude that allows for ‘thin‐
king’ (law) critically.
2 The difficulty in teaching critical legal education: what is methodology?
2.1 The apathetic attitude
The struggle for ‘a radical egalitarian alternative vision of what legal education
should become’ by observing it through the lens of Critical Legal Studies (CLS)
has already famously been identified by Duncan Kennedy in his ‘little red book’,
first published as a pamphlet in 1983, entitled Legal Education and the Reproduc‐
tion of Hierarchy (Kennedy 2004, p. 1). Kennedy makes a ‘utopian proposal’ to
help reduce illegitimate hierarchy and the feelings of alienation that students feel
within law schools (p. 136-139). My article aims to engage in a slightly different
struggle – that of making researchers and educators (and in turn students) think
differently about how they teach (and read) law. It perhaps interprets ‘critical’ too
loosely as an ‘art of critique’ and a certain ‘curiosity’ – which is an important
word, since:
‘the word [curiosity](…) evokes “care”; it evokes the care one takes of what
exists and what might exist; a sharpened sense of reality, but one that is
never immobilised before it; a readiness to find what surrounds us strange
and odd; a certain determination to throw off familiar ways of thought and to
look at the same things in a different way; a passion for seizing what is happe‐
ning now and what is disappearing; a lack of respect for the traditional hierar‐
chies of what is important and fundamental’ (Foucault 2000, p. 325; empha‐
sis added).
Panu Minkkinen also addresses the question ‘what does it mean to be critical’
when talking of ‘critical legal method’ (Minkkinen 2013, p. 119). Surely all
research, at the doctoral level anyway, should be ‘critical’ in the sense that it
employs ‘critical judgement (…) a generic intellectual skill that all researchers are
supposed to be able to apply in relation to the object of their research’ (ibid.).
Minkkinen points us to an understanding of ‘critical’ that echoes the association I
make with Foucault’s ‘curiosity’; he uses Habermas to speak of being ‘critical’ as
‘self-reflection’, a ‘concern with knowledge’ that is ‘emancipatory’:
‘The methodological frame which settles the meaning of the validity of this
category of critical statements can be explained in terms of the notion of self-
reflection. This frees the subject from dependence on hypostatized forces.
Self-reflection is influenced by an emancipatory concern with knowledge (…)’
(Habermas 1966).
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Thus for my purposes, the ‘critical’ in ‘critical legal education’ refers to a concern
with nurturing ‘curiosity’ and ‘self-reflection’ – to developing a ‘critical attitude’ to
what one studies and the questions one asks of it.
My interest in the way in which the ‘art of critique’ is (not) nurtured in law
schools began in 2007 when I started work on an AHRC-sponsored project on
legal research methodologies in European Union and International Law with two
colleagues at the University of Nottingham.1 The impetus for the project, initia‐
ted by Professor Hervey, was a general experience that something was ‘missing’
from these disciplines – in that students did not reflect on their research: on
where it fits in with the discipline, what kinds of research questions they think
are interesting to ask, what theoretical perspective best supports their way of
thinking about their project, and so on. They had no awareness, in other words,
of methodology. Moreover, there was not sufficient guidance available for the
more curious amongst them that were in fact interested in reflecting on these
issues. It was also our experience that staff within law schools (the researchers
and the educators) were often themselves, having been nurtured in a dominantly
doctrinal environment, at a loss as to how to explain to students not only the
importance of these questions but also how to explain ‘methodology’.
In order to substantiate our experiences, we ran two workshops for PhD students
(attended mainly by those beginning or at the early stages of study) and consul‐
ted numerous scholars across ten partner institutions on a set of materials that
eventually were published in a book, entitled Research Methodologies in EU and
International Law (Cryer, Hervey and & Sokhi-Bulley 2011). What we found over
the course of the process was interesting: first, some academic staff either did not
know about, or had little interest in knowing about, methodology. Second, most
PhD students were beginning their research without any knowledge of methodo‐
logy or the opportunity to think about the practice of research and its theoretical
implications. Third, and most interestingly for us, the feedback on the workshops
was extremely positive, with students commenting, for instance, that (Cryer, Her‐
vey and & Sokhi-Bulley 2008, p. 48):
‘This workshop has turned me into a theorist
’‘My assumptions about theories/methodologies have changed’
‘[The workshop]made me focus on methods and theory’
This latter point reveals that a majority of students, once exposed to different
perspectives, approaches or what I am calling ‘alternative methodologies’, are
actually interested in learning about them. The point is that many did not under‐
stand, first, what a methodology is – are there different types of methodologies
1 Professor Tamara Hervey, Jean Monnet Professor of European Union Law, University of Shef‐
field; Professor Robert Cryer, Professor of International and criminal Law, University of Birming‐
ham. For a background to the project, see Cryer, Hervey & Sokhi-Bulley 2011. It is fair to say that
my personal concern here (and indeed that of the project at the time) is law schools in the United
Kingdom only.
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and how do you ‘choose’ your methodology? How, moreover, do you articulate
your methodology? Second, why is methodology important? That is, many see it
as an added complication to their research projects, rather than a necessary part
of good research.
Perhaps a reason explaining why students feel this way is that in most law schools
law is taught in a traditionally doctrinal sense.2 Subjects such as legal theory, legal
philosophy or jurisprudence, are typically considered ‘peripheral subjects’ (Ken‐
nedy 2004, p. 37) – as opposed to the ‘core subjects’ that make up qualifying law
degrees (such as Land Law, Criminal Law and European Union Law). This is rele‐
vant as ‘methodology’ has significant connotations of ‘theory’, as I discuss below.
Another reason may be that there is no real accepted cannon of ‘approaches to
law’ or ‘legal methodologies’. This is in stark contrast to disciplines such as Inter‐
national Relations or Politics, where texts such as Scott Burchill et al.’s Theories of
International Relations outline a series of typically used approaches to the subject
that students are taught to become familiar with (from, Realism, Liberalism and
Constructivism to Critical Theory, Feminism and Poststructuralism).3 The classic
‘jurisprudence’ textbook has assumed that ‘legal positivism’ is ‘the “properly” legal
perspective’,4 focusing on this (and on natural law theories) with perhaps a couple
of chapters at the end on ‘other’ approaches (this, as I explain below, is what I call
‘alternative methodologies’). For instance, Penner et al.’s Introduction to Jurispru‐
dence and Legal Theory has a chapter on Foucault and law, a chapter on feminism
and law, and a chapter on autopoesis. McCoubrey and White’s Textbooks on Juris‐
prudence includes an all-encompassing last chapter on ‘postmodern legal theory’.5
Ratnapala offers an interesting arrangement in his book, Jurisprudence, splitting
Part 1 (Law as it is) from the remainder of the book, which examines what the law
ought to be (Part 2: Law and morality; Part 3: Social dimensions of law; Part 4:
rights and justice). Others, such as the excellent Critical Jurisprudence by Dou‐
zinas and Gearey would simply be considered ‘too alternative’ by some for its
story-telling, CLS style.
The term ‘jurisprudence’ is often used synonymously with legal theory – it thus
‘consists of scientific and philosophical investigations of the social phenomenon
of law and of justice’.6 Douzinas and Gearey, however, go further and describe
‘jurisprudence’ as ‘the task of uncovering and pronouncing the truth about law’
2 This article uses ‘doctrinal’ and ‘legal positivism’ synonymously. I make this association since
legal positivism, as a methodology, is interested in questions concerning the description and
explanation of law as it is, in empirical observation. For a similar understanding of the relation
between the two terms, see Cryer, Hervey & Sokhi-Bulley 2011, p. 38 and Minkkinen 2013,
p. 123. For an interesting alternative analysis of the meaning and value of ‘doctrinal’ methodo‐
logy, see Hutchinson 2013, p. 7.
3 Burchill et al. 2009. See also Dunne, Kurki & Smith 2013 and Steans et al. 2010.
4 Minkkinen 2013, p. 119, who takes this from Hart. See further Hart 2012.
5 McCoubrey & White 1999. See also the revised and updated version, Penner & Melissaris 2012.
6 Ratnapala 2009, p. 3. As Ratnapala also highlights, ‘jurisprudence’ can of course also be used to
‘refer to the interpretation of the law given by a court’ (p. 3).
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(Douzinas & Gearey 2005, p. 5). This task, they argue, has been approached both
internally and externally; internal approaches rely on the perspective of the judge
or lawyer. External theories, by contrast, look for a wider non-legal explanatory
context for the ‘facts’ expounded by the judges and lawyers; they look for a socio‐
logical and socio-legal context. External theories, they argue, have been ‘demoted’
in the Law School curriculum, as ‘legal positivism has been the dominant and
typically modernist internal approach’ (ibid.). This has led, they argue, to the
‘moral poverty of the jurisprudence of the twentieth century’ (ibid.). I argue that
the external approaches, or what I am calling ‘alternative’ (i.e., to legal positivism)
approaches to law are necessary so that we, and our students, might discover alte‐
rative truths about the law and about society.
2.2 Methodology versus theory versus method?
Talking of canons and textbooks as tools for students raises another question: are
we talking about theory or about methodology? And what about method? There has
been a burgeoning of late in books on legal methods – and we certainly teach cour‐
ses on law and method to our students. ‘Methodology’ undoubtedly has theoreti‐
cal connotations. So, for instance, a legal positivist methodology will use ideas
from the ‘theory’ of legal positivism – that all law is created and laid down (‘posi‐
ted’) by a law-making authority, that the validity of a rule of law lies in its formal
legal status (not its relation to morality or other external validating factors – i.e.,
law is self-referential), that there is a concern with social standards that are
recognized as authoritative: judicial decisions, legislation, custom.7 This theoreti‐
cal perspective will then inform the types of questions that a legal positivist will
be interested in asking – questions such as, What is the law? What does the social
situation look like? And it also influences what they will not ask: What ought the
law to be? Or, how is it the way it is – taking into account social, political and phi‐
losophical factors? In the same way, a postcolonial methodology will use ideas
from postcolonial theory – such as challenging the taken for granted assumptions
and naturalized categories of knowledge that are produced by the promotion of
Western values.8 The types of generalized questions that are relevant for a post‐
colonial critique might therefore be: How does the law subordinate or silence peo‐
ples from the Global ‘South’ and ‘Third’ World? What violences are hidden by
law’s claim to race or culture neutrality?
My point here is that methodology is not about ‘high theory’ – it is not about
‘being a theorist’. It is, rather, about using the tools that theory, or different theo‐
ries, provide to enable one to determine which are the right questions to ask for
the particular project one is interested in. So, for instance, one does not need to
‘be a Foucauldian’ to use ideas of disciplinary power or governmentality to study
an aspect of human rights law. Nor does one have to be loyal to only one particu‐
lar theoretical, or methodological, perspective. It is of course possible to think like
7 See the description of ‘legal positivism’ in Cryer, Hervey & Sokhi-Bulley 2011, p. 37-39.
8 For an example of ‘applying’ postcolonial theory to human rights, see Doty 1996; Mutua 2002;
Rajagopal 2003.
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a poststructural feminist or to have a methodology that shows you think like a
legal positivist, a feminist and a Marxist – though these positions raise inevitable
tensions that must be negotiated by the researcher or student. There is the basic
and obvious point that one must be true to the idea, to the theory. But I suggest
that different theories, or approaches, collectively provide a toolbox of skills that
we can take from (as researchers) and teach our students to use (as educators).
This is ‘not’, as Peters states, ‘a “shopping-mall approach to ‘method’” but a pre‐
condition for informed criticism’.9 There is also a danger, when trying to teach
methodology, with using the term ‘theory’. Experience shows that it scares off
students (and in some cases the educators also!). They associate the term with
high theory/philosophy/jurisprudence – and not with a toolbox of ideas that pro‐
vides them with the skills they need to be successful lawyers.
It is worth noting that as well as a distinction between methodology and theory, a
distinction can also be made between methodology and ‘method’. A method has
empirical and sociological connotations – so, is the method a qualitative or quan‐
titative analysis? What methods of data collection are used – documentary analy‐
sis, case studies, observation, interviews, for example? It is essentially about what
you do in a project, as opposed to how you think it.10 Most, if not all, universities
will teach courses on ‘research methods’. Here students usually learn about quali‐
tative methods – for example, how to conduct (expert) interviews. They would
engage in questions such as ‘What is qualitative interviewing?’, ‘Why interview’
and ‘What are the purposes of interviews’, ‘What kinds of information can we
obtain from interviews’, ‘How to prepare an interview guide’, ‘How to select inter‐
viewees’, ‘How to carry out data collection and interview documentation’, etc.11
They also learn about quantitative methods – such as surveys and questionnaires,
using analytic tools such as cross-tabs, correlation and regression and SPSS.12
Interestingly, there has been a burgeoning of late in law books on method. Mike
McConville and Wing Hong Chui’s Research Methods for Law concentrates on
making ‘available methods of research – legalistic, empirical, comparative and
theoretical’ accessible to law students (McConville & Chui 2007, p. 5); each chap‐
ter outlines a particular research ‘method’ within law, and helpfully and interes‐
tingly uses actual research projects as examples to illustrate how the method can
be used to conduct legal research (p. 7). ‘Method’ and ‘methodology’ appear to be
used interchangeably. Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton’s Research Methods in
Law addresses the question of method versus methodology directly – and asserts
that whilst the contributors may not agree on the precise and different definition
of these terms, ‘all of them agree that establishing an appropriate theoretical
9 Peters 2001, p. 37, quoting Koskenniemi.
10 See further Cryer, Hervey & Sokhi-Bulley 2011 and also Watkins & Burton 2013, p. 2-4.
11 ‘Techniques and Methods in Law and the Social Sciences’, LAW7002, March-May 2013 – compul‐
sory module, LLM in Law and Governance, Queen’s University Belfast.
12 Ibid. SPSS, known previously as Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, is the most commonly
used programme for the statistical analysis. For a standard guide to using SPSS written for social
scientists, see Acton et al 2009.
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basis for a research project is as important as determining the appropriate
method/s for carrying out the research’ (Watkins & Burton 2013, p. 2-3). The
book offers a ‘challenge [to] readers who are intending to take a pure, doctrinal
approach to their research to provide a justification for the reason for doing so’
(p. 4). Whether doctoral research could and ought to be underpinned by elements
of social sciences is considered by the contributors in Mark Van Hoecke’s Metho‐
dologies of Legal Research: What Kind of Discipline for What Kind of Method? Should
legal doctrine be merged with the social sciences? Van Hoecke suggests that Law
should use these disciplines but not try to integrate them, so as to avoid problems
of epistemology, of methodology and of research skills (Van Hoecke 2013, p. xiii).
Whilst I disagree with this, I do agree with the self-reflexive sentiment of Roger
Brownsword’s question of ‘what am I doing as a legal scholar in contract law?’ in
his chapter (Brownsword 2013, p. 133). It is crucial that ‘the researcher is remin‐
ded of the need to be reflective and reflexive during the research process and to
question whether the chosen methodology is the most appropriate for research‐
ing the chosen topic (McConville & Chui 2007, p. 3).
I argue that methodology is therefore about ‘how to think’ a project. This is diffe‐
rent to how to think about a project (method). I interpret methodology as a way
of thinking, an attitude – it is therefore not as much about theory or method but
about an approach, a perspective, or a lens through which to see a project. The
reason the methodology is so vital is that it influences the hypothesis, research
questions and sources used in a project. Arriving at one’s research questions and
‘deciding upon’ a methodology is thus a reflexive and circular process, as the dia‐
gram below illustrates:13
Methodology thus influences the thesis – i.e., the hypothesis, research questions
and method – which in turn directly influences the critical discussion, the sources
that will be used, the argument and the structure of a project. It is therefore vital
that as educators we teach our students about methodology. Research is now an
integral part of the curriculum for undergraduates and postgraduates alike, with
coursework becoming an increasingly popular form of assessment (McConville &
Chui 2007, p. 2). Students at all levels require methodological skills for research.
Methodology is the link from having a topic for a dissertation and turning that
topic into a thesis by identifying the right questions for that person’s interest,
personality, and available sources. I am often asked in the talk that I refer to at
the start of this paper, ‘how do I choose a methodology’? My starting point in ans‐
wer to this is that methodology stems from a personal viewpoint or attitude – so,
it is not a ‘choice’ in the sense that you simply ‘add in and stir’ any methodology
to a project. The point I then make is that we all, obviously, think differently and
so will be interested in different questions regarding the same thing. These diffe‐
rent personal attitudes should be acknowledged (as methodology) and given a
name in research projects. Most of the time students are not aware that, on the
one hand, their attitude or ability to choose a methodology is impaired by having
13 See also Cryer, Hervey & Sokhi-Bulley 2011, p. 8-10.
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been disciplined and trained in a legal positivist tradition only and, on the other
hand that their ‘chosen’ approach, if doctrinal, should be labelled legal positivist
(it is fair to say that the majority of undergraduate and LLM-level dissertations
are ‘black-letter’; McConville & Chui 2007, p. 4). This label is useful and necessary
to determine as it will help them think critically about the types of questions they
are interested in asking. Similarly, if they have enjoyed reading a feminist scholar
let’s say, they might benefit from being encouraged to use one of the array of
feminist perspectives to think their ideas and arrive at suitable research questi‐
ons. As Ann Peters states, ‘methodological explicitness is preferable because it
contributes to a transparency of argument’ (Peters 2001, p. 37).
Students also ask whether there is more than one type of methodology, and if so,
how many? In the Research Methodologies book, we present what we call ‘the list’
(Cryer, Hervey & Sokhi-Bulley 2011, p. 10) – it is by no means an exhaustive list
but one that we felt reflected the dominant and also what I call in this paper the
‘alternative’ methodological perspectives. We called the former the ‘Main Juris‐
prudential Approaches’ – i.e., legal positivism and natural law perspectives. The
latter were called ‘Extensions and Negations’, which were split into two parts:
first, the ‘Modern and Critical Approaches’ – which included governance, Mar‐
xism, critical theory, feminist perspectives, postcolonial theory, for instance and









42 Recht en Methode in onderzoek en onderwijs 2013 (3) 2
Alternative Methodologies: Learning Critique as a Skill
second, the ‘law and’ approaches – which included for example, law and geogra‐
phy, law and international relations, and law and geography (ibid.).
As the book explains, ‘the list’ was arrived at after much deliberation and agoni‐
zing (p. 11). It also acknowledges areas that are missing from the list – notably
comparative law. This, it was decided, is arguably a subject in itself, with its own
theories and methods (p. 12).14 We drew on various sources for inspiration, since
there is something approaching an ‘accepted cannon’ of international law theories
(such as Steven Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter’s The Methods of International
Law.15 Ratner and Slaughter define ‘method’ as ‘the application of a conceptual
apparatus or framework – a theory of international law – to the concrete pro‐
blems faced by the international community’ (Ratner & Slaughter 2004, p. 3).
This is what we understand in the book as ‘methodology’, ‘theory’ or ‘approach’.
Their list (legal positivism; New Haven school; international legal process; critical
legal studies; international law and international relations; feminist jurispru‐
dence; Third World approaches to international law; law and economics) has a
similar starting point to the list in the book.
The ‘extensions and negations’ were so-labelled since they extend or depart from
the traditional approaches. They are, in other words, ‘alternative’. However, part
of what I want to stress in this paper is that this does not make these ‘other’
approaches to (EU or international) law any less useful to students (or indeed
researchers) than the mainstream or traditional approaches. A mainstream/alter‐
native dichotomy suggests that that which comes under ‘alternative’ is lesser, or
inferior, or lacking in importance. To use Kennedy’s word, it is merely ‘periphe‐
ral’. However, I argue that these alternative approaches present us with the
opportunity of alternative truths. They allow us to change the research question
of a project depending upon the lens – i.e., the perspective, or methodology –
used. I illustrate this below using an example exercise asked of our students.
Before that, let me outline an example of an alternative methodology that I have
personally found useful, and why.
2.3 Governmentality as an ‘alternative methodology’
A perhaps awkward neologism, ‘governmentality’ is a term coined by Foucault in
his later work to explain the power relations that make individuals
govern(ment)able and thereby allow for the exercise of a regulatory, or governing,
power (Foucault 2002a, p. 201). Thus,
‘This word [government]must be allowed the very broad meaning it had in
the sixteenth century. “Government” did not refer only to political structures
or to the management of states; rather, it designated the way in which the
conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed – the government of
children, of souls, of communities, of the sick (…) To govern, in this sense, is to
14 See further Bell 2013, p. 155.
15 . For another overview of ‘approaches’ to international law, see also Peters 2001.
Recht en Methode in onderzoek en onderwijs 2013 (3) 2 43
Bal Sokhi-Bulley
control the possible field of action of others’ (Foucault 2002b, p.341; emphasis
added).
Understood in this perhaps literal manner (the verb ‘to govern’ can literally mean
‘to control or influence’; Concise Oxford Dictionary 1999), government refers to
the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Gordon 1991, p. 1-2); a form of activity or practice that
aims to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons. In a lecture
given at the Collège de France in 1978, posthumously given the title ‘Governmen‐
tality’,16 Foucault presents his most concise definition of the term. He explains
that ‘governmentality’ means three things (Foucault 2002a, p. 219-220): first,
‘the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, reflections, calculati‐
ons and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of
power, which has as its target population’. Second, governmentality refers to ‘the
tendency that, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led to the
pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline and so on) of this type
of power, which may be termed “government”‘. Third, governmentality is the
(result of the) process by which the state gradually ‘becomes governmentalized’.
For the purposes of this paper, it is important to understand that ‘governmenta‐
lity’ can be understood as both the process of government (that is, as an ‘art of
government’ itself; Foucault 2007, p. 205) and as a methodology (that is, as a ‘rati‐
onality of government’ – a way of thinking about the practice of government, and
hence of whom or what is being governed, what governing is, whom or what can
govern, and so forth; p. 106). It is a ‘govern/mentality’ (Barron 2005, p. 984). I
describe governmentality as a methodology to understand various practices and
processes in law. There is a large and growing number of scholars who use a
governmentality perspective to understand the ways in which technologies of
government operate – for instance in the context of crime control(Garland 1997,
p. 173; Rose 2000, p. 321),17 healthcare (Rose 2007), immigration and asylum
(Bigo 2007, p. 63; Darling 2011, p. 263; Inda 2006), e-Government (Mori‐
son 2010, p. 551), and new governance agencies and human rights (Sokhi-Bul‐
ley 2011, p. 139-156). What these contributions have in common is the use of
governmentality as a methodology – not simply as a ‘theory’ (which it is not) but
as a tool with which to better understand the ‘thing’ (e.g., interrogating the 1999
Immigration and Asylum Act and subsequent developments and presenting the
UK border as a site of domopolitics – (Darling 2011); describing rights as techno‐
logies of governmentality that govern the global virtuous identity of the EU as a
rights actor (Sokhi-Bulley 2011) that they are critiquing. Governmentality is thus
a ‘creative’ concept and a creative methodology – meaning it is a flexible, open-
ended and above all useful tool. It is essentially about satisfying that ‘curio‐
sity’ – to ‘find what surrounds us as strange and odd (…) to look at the same
things in a different way’. It helps us to challenge typical conceptions of gover‐
16 Foucault 2002a. Also presented by Foucault as the fourth lecture in the course Security, Territory,
Population (Foucault 2007, p. 87).
17 See also Rose and Miller (2008) on ‘governing communities’.
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nment as implying state power, sovereignty or hierarchy and examining instead
the various technologies and tactics, the often mundane processes, through
which power circulates in a heterarchical fashion.
Moreover, recent academic conferences have been built around the central Fou‐
cauldian themes of biopower and genealogy – note for example, the Law Culture
and the Humanities annual conference of 2013, themed ‘Sculpting the Human:
Law, culture and biopolitics’;18 and, the Critical Legal Conference of 2009, themed
‘Genealogies: Excavating modernities’.19 This illustrates that the label ‘alternative’
is perhaps limited in its appreciation of the type of literature that does engage
with the less mainstream approaches to law – although the question still remains
of how we communicate these to our students and this is what I come on to in the
next section.
3 Methodology as skill
3.1 Methodology and transferrable skills
Thus far I have been trying to show that methodology is not just about theory or
about method – it is also, and crucially, about a critical attitude. This attitude can
be nurtured and disciplined – it can be taught and learned as a skill. Students
nowadays want to know what they need to do to gain their degree so that they
can go on and practice law. They respond to the language of ‘skills’. I teach on a
module called Legal Theory and face a constant challenge of having to explain the
validity of theory to students, the majority of whom want to qualify as lawyers
and practice. It means marketing ‘theory’ as a ‘tool’ – as a ‘skill’. Similarly, I teach
‘methodologies’ as one of three ‘skills sessions’ on the main human rights module
for postgraduates studying on the LLM in Human Rights. Without these (albeit
brief) sessions, postgraduate students otherwise have no ‘formal’ exposure to
methodologies before going on to write their end of year dissertation.
I use the terminology ‘marketing as skills’ slightly uneasily because of its manage‐
ment-speak connotations, but this is precisely what we are doing. Programmes
such as the Personal Development Portfolio at Queen’s ask students in their third
and final year of undergraduate studies to define what they understand by ‘trans‐
ferrable skills’ and whether they see ‘critical analysis’ or ‘critique’ as such a skill.20
It is interesting to observe that students often do not realize the skills they have
learnt over the course of their law degree – both research skills (for example, how
to find and cite a case; how to reference correctly; presentation skills) and perso‐
nal development skills (for example, time management; punctuality; group or
18 http://www.law.syr.edu/academics/centers/lch/conference.html (accessed 15 June 2013).
19 http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2009/05/conference-announcement-critical-legal-confe
rence-at-leicester.html (accessed 15 June 2013).
20 http://www.law.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofLaw/Education/Undergraduates/PersonalDevelop
mentPlanning/ (accessed 15 June 2013).
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teamwork).21 It is perhaps relatively easy for them to see how these might trans‐
late, or ‘transfer’, to an employment context. What they do not generally see with
as much ease is how learning about different legal theories, or methodologies,
might help them in the workplace.
A ‘skill’ is literally defined as ‘the ability to do something well; expertise’.22 By
learning about (alternative) methodologies, students are becoming experts in
how to (better) understand law. They are developing their conceptual (ideas), cre‐
ative (originality) and critical (evaluation) skills. They are thus gaining the ability
to challenge assumptions about the law; to consider alternative questions on a
topic of law; they are therefore learning the ability to create alternative truths.
Alternative methodologies provide a toolbox of approaches to a problem/research
question – the ‘tool’ may be governmentality, or feminism, or Marxism, etc. The
point is that the problem or research question can be approached using tools
other than the mainstream approaches. And students should be exposed to all the
tools in the toolbox – so they might decide for themselves which is the most
appropriate for how they think. Legal research methodologies should thus be
taught as a skills or tools within ‘a tool-box which others can rummage through to
find a tool they can use however they wish in their own area’ so that our students
might be ‘users, not readers’.23
The question of how this might be useful to the practicing lawyer still remains.
Many students view ‘law as craft’, where ‘practical professionalism’ is seen as an
alternative to adopting an external academic discipline (e.g., economics, socio‐
logy, psychology or philosophy; Dagan & Kreitner 2011, p. 671, 677, 689-690).
Here I suggest that methodology is practice – as a (critical) attitude, it will influ‐
ence how you practice the law. How well you are able to identify not only what
the law is but to challenge its assumptions and to interrogate them. It means to
take on the challenge of not becoming the docile (if still successful) lawyer, as I
will explain further below.
3.2 The critical attitude: searching for alternative truths
The students at the Research Methods workshops were fascinated to discover
how the end product of a project can change depending on the questions you ask,
so, depending on your methodology – that you can choose not be governed by
what I’m calling traditional or black-letter approaches. One of the exercises
during the workshops was to draft a potential outline for a dissertation topic. The
students were asked to identify their research questions and their approach/per‐
spective /methodology. They were then asked to swap ‘thinking hats’ (De
Bono 1992) and reconceptualise their projects from an entirely different perspec‐
21 Kennedy (2004, p. 31) gives a summary of ‘simple but important things’ (i.e., skills) that law stu‐
dents learn.
22 Oxford English Dictionaries Online: http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/skill?q=skill
(accessed 2 July 2013).
23 Foucault 1994, p. 523-524, commenting on his work as ‘fragments’ to be used as part of a ‘critical
attitude’.
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tive to show how the thesis would look completely different (Cryer, Hervey &
Sokhi-Bulley 2008, p. 49). So, for instance, if you are doing a legal positivist analy‐
sis into how human rights discourse has evolved in the European Union, for
instance, how do your research questions change if you adopt a postcolonial
approach – where you are suddenly interested not in questions about what the
law is and the rule of law but in questions of genealogy, of power relations, of
‘otherness’.
We conducted a similar exercise with our final year undergraduates at my institu‐
tion – we asked them to think about writing a feature piece on the ‘London Riots’
of August 2012, identifying key issues, which we all agreed on as being: race,
class, poverty, male, youth and crime. We then asked them to write their piece
from a legal positivist perspective, a CRT perspective, a feminist perspective and a
Foucauldian perspective and to identify how the approach influences the questions
you ask, which influences your research project as a whole. That is, the perspective
influences the effect of the analysis – what you are trying to show or prove in the
project. So, for instance, looking at the riots from a legal positivist perspective
would necessitate asking: What law applies? What laws were violated? What deci‐
sions did the courts make? The effect of this type of questioning, of this type of
methodology is to then make a statement that qualifies these questions – for
example, that the riots resulted in the criminalization of this behaviour and in
some cases the handing out of disproportionate criminal sentences (note the case
of R v Blackshaw).24 Examining the riots from a feminist perspective might
prompt questions such as: Did the riots reflect a gender issue? Did they normalize
male violence (women being portrayed as the ‘broom brigade’ and the tea ser‐
vers)? Did they stereotype the mothers of the delinquent youth as ‘bad parents’?
The effect of this type of questioning, of this type of methodology, is to be able to
state, for instance, that the riots did normalize male violence.
The point is that different perspectives (or methodologies) on a problem/topic
create ‘alternative truths’ about them because they tell the same story in a diffe‐
rent way. Many of the students were taken aback by how the story of the riots
changed depending on the perspective used. It is an important skill, this article
argues, to be able to look at the same things in a different way, in an alternative
way, in a more critical way.
3.3 Moving beyond the docile, successful lawyer
Matthew Ball comments that although it is often argued that law schools provide
a negative, competitive, and conservative environment for students, pushing
them towards self-interested, vocational concerns, this is nevertheless a produc‐
tive process (Ball 2012, p. 103). Using Foucault’s work on the government of the
self, he argues that far from law students being repressed, they engage in a self-
fashioning process that allows them to act effectively as legal personae.
24 R v Blackshaw and Others [2011] EWCA Crim 2312 saw the courts deliver a sentence of 4 years
detention to Jordon Blackshaw for ‘incitement by the use of Facebook’.
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So, perhaps I am wrongly concerned with importance of teaching critical legal
education. Perhaps if the students govern themselves to become successful legal
practitioners without reading Foucault or Derrida or Habermas, for instance, we
have been successful educators. My problem with this is the resultant docility
that governmentality within law schools engenders: the docile, successful lawyer
that has not been encouraged to ‘think about the same things in a different way’
or, then in turn, to engage in critique and to resist the dominant paradigm. An
awareness of methodology can be in itself a form of ‘resistance’: Kennedy (2004)
uses this idea to argue that educating students on what he calls ‘theory’ can be
used to resist the reproduction of a hierarchy (that already exists in legal educa‐
tion) in the practice of law and in society.
4 Conclusion
What does ‘resistance’ mean in this context? It means behaving differently – a
‘counter-conduct’, or ‘struggle against the processes implemented for conducting
others’ (Foucault 2007, p. 201; my emphasis). These processes include the way in
which legal education operates – often without exposing students to critical
methodologies that would provide them with the skills to view (legal) issues, to
solve (legal) problems differently. We need a sort of ‘revolt of conduct’ (ibid.) in
legal education, such that courses on theory and methodology are not relegated to
the periphery; such that methodology is seen as an attitude and perhaps more
crucially in educational terms as a skill. To echo Hanoch Dagan and Roy Kreitner,
‘the implication would be that while people in the law school could do anything in
the way of scholarship, they would also have to speak legal theory if not with
native proficiency then at least as a second language’ (Dagan & Kreitner 2011,
p. 10). Law Schools should aspire to teach legal theory as methodology and as
skill. Classes on legal research methods should discuss methodology as an atti‐
tude; they should feature alternative methodologies and encourage a critical atti‐
tude in students. McConville and Chui alert us to ‘evidence that law schools in the
United Kingdom, the United States and elsewhere are offering new postgraduate
programmes (such as socio-legal studies, feminist legal studies, critical legal stu‐
dies and new approaches to international law) that encourage an interdisciplinary
approach to the study of law’ (McConville & Chui 2007, p. 5). This is of course an
example of positive developments in the area of critical legal education and
should be encouraged.
What will this resistance achieve? It will hopefully produce better quality work
from our students, as they exercise their conceptual, critical and creative skills. It
will produce a less docile subject – the student who has the knowledge, who has
been ‘emancipated’ by that knowledge (to use Habermas’ wording) and who can
therefore say that she does not want to be conditioned to think like that. The stu‐
dent that is not afraid to engage in ‘a different form of conduct (…) wanting to be
conducted differently, by other leaders (conducteurs) and other shepherds,
towards other objectives and forms of salvation and through other procedures
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and methods’ (Foucault 2007, p. 194-195). These are the alterative procedures, or
methodologies, that depart from legal positivism and are all too often removed
from legal education.
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Empirical Facts: A Rationale for Expanding
Lawyers’ Methodological Expertise*
Terry Hutchinson
Legal academics focus on the study of the nature of legal rules and legal reaso‐
ning. This emphasis on rules has the potential to obscure the importance of facts
in the determination of the law. Judges use general facts about the world in
developing and interpreting the law in addition to the facts they use that are spe‐
cific to the dispute between the parties. Practicing lawyers present versions of the
facts as truth in arguing their client’s case in court. Facts also provide an evidence
base for lawmakers to formulate policy and draft new law and rules.
‘Evidence based’ practice is used widely in the fields of medicine and business.
This article describes the evidence-based practice paradigm. It argues that facts
about society gleaned from social research form a legitimate evidence base that is
important for legislative reform. An evidence-based approach seems an obvious
step in formulating effective laws and providing legal solutions to social problems
(Head 2010). It should be used to assist legislators in developing and ensuring
well-founded public policies leading to sound legislation. However, in law reform,
the evidence base is often overwhelmed by populist perceptions and political ide‐
ology. A recent legislative amendment to youth justice sentencing options provi‐
des a pertinent case study where the evidence base is being disregarded. This arti‐
cle argues that there would be more likelihood that ‘good’ law, that is law that is
just and that brings about an intended outcome, would be achieved if the law is
based on identified ‘facts’ about society and the way it operates. Secondly, it
argues that empirical research and research about ‘facts’ in society are important
factors in assisting judges in the development of authoritative jurisprudence. In
doing so, this article highlights the use of the evidence base in cases in the High
Court of Australia.
This article argues that there is a need for those lawyers who play a part in law
reform (legislators and those involved in the law reform process) and for those
who play a part in formulating policy-based common law rules (judges and practi‐
tioners) to know more about how facts are established in the social sciences. For
this reason, law students need enhanced training in interdisciplinary and empiri‐
cal methods in order to tap into the ever growing body of evidence from social
research. Law students need empirical methodologies skills and awareness to fully
prepare for legal practice and for the many influential roles law graduates have as
advocates, judges, practitioners, legislators, researchers and policy makers.
* Melody Martin, Aaron Walker and Josh Caeiro (QUT Faculty of Law) were the research assistants
on this article. I also wish to acknowledge the assistance of Professor Charles Sampford.
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1 The paradigm of evidence-based practice and law
The modern concept of evidence-based practice originated within the health ser‐
vices sector. The British physician Archie Cochrane published his Effectiveness and
Efficiency. Random Reflections on Health Services in 1972, but it was not until the
1990s that this theory of practice gained more general acceptance (Hjor‐
land 2011). The paradigm of evidence-based practice stipulates that decisions
should be based on research-based knowledge collected in a systematic way using
recognized scientific standards with research overviews synthesizing knowledge
from multiple primary studies (ibid.). Is this movement affecting legal practice,
public policy and law?
Within the legal academy, particularly in the United States and Canada, the last
three decades have witnessed a growing trend towards the use of empirical
research (Ellickson 2000; Shanahan 2006). In addition, there is a growing impe‐
tus for evidence based practice from disciplines aligned with law – the social sci‐
entists, criminologists and statisticians. In the US, there are signs that the legal
academy is trying to enhance its expertise, for example the George Mason Univer‐
sity School of Law is offering law professors special workshops in empirical
methods and the Society for Empirical Legal Studies based at Cornell University
encourages empirical methodological expertise amongst legal academics through
its successful conferences each year. These meetings are aimed at highlighting
recent empirical research on the legal profession, courts and legal practice, and at
the same time, encouraging and honing empirical methodological expertise
amongst legal academics, through its Journal of Empirical Legal Studies launched in
2004. .1 The situation within legal academia in Australia also reflects this change
to a positive attitude towards empirical methods, spurred on by the growth in
publicly funded interdisciplinary research emanating from universities. Studies
demonstrate a gradual shift to the use of non-doctrinal methods in association
with the traditional doctrinal work (Hutchinson & Duncan 2012). In addition,
there is the on-going work of the Law and Society and other interdisciplinary
associations in all jurisdictions.2 In the UK, the tensions within the policy devel‐
opment arena are evident with the 2006 Nuffield Report signalling a movement
towards gathering improved data and ensuring training in empirical methods wit‐
hin the academy (Genn, Partington & Wheeler 2006). Despite this, the Legal Ser‐
vices Research Centre (LSRC), an independent research division of the Legal
Services Commission, which was established to inform legal aid policy and the
implementation of reform through quantitative and qualitative empirical
research, was closed in 2013.
The take-up of the use of the evidence base within the Australian legal profession
is difficult to measure. Lawyers seem not to be embracing the new evidence-based
1 See the website at http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/sels/.
2 The Law and Society Association of Australia and New Zealand, http://www.lsaanz.org/; Austra‐
lian and New Zealand Society of Criminology, http://www.anzsoc.org/; and their equivalents in
the US, UK and Europe.
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paradigm to the same extent as other professions. Raschlinski argues that the
explanation for this difference is that Law lacks the same ‘uniformity of purpose’
as other disciplines:
‘It is often politics by other means that sorts winners and losers, rather than
right and wrong, thereby clouding the normative environment. What is
accepted fact in medicine and business is contestable in law. Law’s political
nature does not render empirical testing of widely held myths a hopeless mis‐
adventure but complicates the hope (and the value) of creating an evidence-
based law’ (Rachlinksi 2010-2011, p. 901).
Unlike medicine where there is a clear goal of providing ‘a positive outcome for
the patient’s health’, or business, where success is judged by the ‘bottom line’,
Rachlinski argues that Law lacks ‘a unifying, organizing principle’ (p. 918). Howe‐
ver, in an argument reminiscent of Peter Ziegler’s assertion of the ‘non-existent
legal paradigm’ (Ziegler 1988, p. 569), efforts to define Law’s purpose ‘lead only
to greater complexity’ and ‘conflicting purpose’ (Rachlinksi 2010-2011, p. 901).
He refers to the ‘conflicting themes’ in the various areas of law, so that tort and
contract law, for example, aim for efficiency, but to some degree the aim is also
towards fairness for the parties involved, and criminal law needs to balance the
rights of the accused ‘with society’s broader need to control crime’ (ibid.). But
surely, as Rachlinski suggests, the point for Law is ‘to create better law-law infor‐
med by reality’ (p. 910).
2 The importance of the social evidence base in developing law
Catherine Althaus, Peter Bridgman and Glyn Davis have written an influential
text on policy research in Australia (Althaus, Bridgman & Davis 2007). In outli‐
ning the policy change cycle, they highlight the need for extensive research and
consultation, and both in Australia and overseas, recognition has been given to
the need to bridge the policy/research divide so as to establish ‘mechanisms for
identifying and plugging key gaps in research knowledge’ in order to infuse this
information into the formulation of policy (Nutley 2003, p. 20; Nutley, Powell &
Davies 2013).
Accordingly, recent Australian history provides numerous examples of govern‐
ments providing meaningful opportunities for the broader community of interest
and non-government policy experts to engage in policy analysis and the formula‐
tion of options for reform. In 2008, the Australian left wing Labor government
announced a positive stance on evidence-led policy:
‘The Government will not adopt overseas models uncritically. We’re interes‐
ted in facts, not fads. But whether it’s aged care, vocational education or dis‐
ability services, Australian policy development should be informed by the
best of overseas experience and analysis. In fostering a culture of policy inno‐
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vation, we should trial new approaches and policy options through small-
scale pilot studies. Policy innovation and evidence-based policy making is at
the heart of being a reformist government’ (Rudd 2008).
However, it seems that more often than not the results of this evidence, produced
for example by specially established government enquiries and academic research
submitted in response to departmental discussion papers, is not used within
policy development. This has led some commentators to question government
tactics and query whether governments are only using the inquiries and evidence-
gathering processes ‘as strategies – to avoid criticism, to be seen to be doing
something, to delay action or to divert attention’ (Fishwick & Bolitho 2010,
p. 176), leading to a growing bank of information which has been labelled by
John Lea as ‘museums of official discourse’ (Lea 2004, p. 184). It would still seem
‘that many policy decisions are made in isolation from any real research, and
that directions for change, based on anecdotal evidence, are imposed from
the top. The community may only be involved at a very late stage through
consultation processes designed to justify and legitimise’ (Hutchinson 2010,
p. 73).
Why is this evidence being ignored? One very influential tool working against evi‐
dence-based practice in the formulation of law is anecdote. Politicians, for exam‐
ple, both in Australia and overseas, benefit from highly publicized stories invol‐
ving violent criminals which allow the conservative parties to rely heavily on a
‘tough on crime’ stance at every opportunity. One decision by a Parole Board,
which in hindsight may have been unwise, can affect the rehabilitation hopes of
hundreds. One widely publicized murder by a parolee in Victoria recently has
prompted an overall review of the procedures and parole system in that state
which will inevitably result in tighter parole requirements (Callinan 2013). Just
as in the courts, difficult or unusual or exceptional cases can cause the clarity of
the law to be ‘obscured by exceptions and strained interpretations’, so too unu‐
sual and heinous criminal acts can incite public opinion to the point where politi‐
cians pass ‘bad’ laws. Highly publicized incidents can result in unnecessarily harsh
or unjust laws, so that for example special offences covering looting during disas‐
ters are added to the statute books despite the fact that basic stealing offences
already cover all pertinent situations.3
As well as anecdote, governments have a tendency to rely on common wisdom
unsupported by scientific research, public perception of what the voters believe
and want in the context of a government voted in with a political mandate, chea‐
per short term options and simplistic solutions. Therefore, many factors other
than research evidence shape the policy process including ‘prevailing public opi‐
nion; political policy events such as elections; changes of ministers and govern‐
3 See for example the Criminal Code (Looting in Declared Areas) Amendment Bill 2013 (Qld) follo‐
wing a few incidents which occurred during the Queensland floods.
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ments; fiscal constraints and budgets; institutional constraints; policy actors;
political power; policy discourse; organizational cultures; agenda setting; one-off
events; political economy; and new managerialism’ as well as ‘penal populism’; the
‘politics of law and order’ and ‘the performance indicators of the State Plan’ (Fis‐
hwick & Bolitho 2010, notes omitted). One recent study has even demonstrated
that people ignore numerical facts that they have accepted in another context if
the evidence is placed in a political context which conflicts with their political
beliefs (Nesbit 2013).4 Given this research it is pertinent to ask whether law-
making will change when lawyers have more empirical knowledge and skills.
Legislation is certainly enacted that conflicts with the results of social research.
One example is the establishment of boot camps for youthful offenders. In
Queensland, the Youth Justice (Boot Camp Orders) and Other Legislation Amend‐
ment Act 2012 commenced in January 2013. While boot camps may seem a good
option to instil discipline and lead young people towards a more appropriate
future path, the research demonstrates that the problems being experienced by
many youthful offenders are not amenable to simplistic solutions and that these
are not the actual outcomes experienced by many boot camp participants. The
weight of social research evidence demonstrates that in the past boot camps for
young offenders have not been effective in reducing reoffending. A meta-analysis
of 32 robust research studies of militaristic boot camps concluded that ‘this com‐
mon and defining feature of a boot-camp is not effective in reducing post boot-
camp offending’ (Wison, MacKenzie & Mitchell 2008, p. 3). Similarly, a meta-
review of crime reduction programs conducted in Washington State found that
boot camps did not reduce recidivism among participants (Drake, Aos & Mil‐
ler 2009). At the same time other more expensive diversionary programs5 with
positive evaluations, such as court ordered youth justice conferencing, have been
discontinued in order to achieve short term budgetary gains.6 There are long term
risks involved in ignoring the evidence base in important social areas such as
youth justice. These risks include increased youth detention rates, higher costs of
detention, net widening, and inequitable impacts on Indigenous youth.
The evidence base of course does not have the answers to all society’s difficult
problems. Many of the ‘wicked’ social problems such as Indigenous disadvantage
are not amenable to simple solutions. They require complex multi-faceted long-
term adjustments to policy. But clear evidence where it exists should not be igno‐
red and a more empirically trained legal profession should surely increase the
likelihood of the evidence base being assessed more accurately, given the risks
(and costs) involved where clear evidence is ignored in the process of policy for‐
mulation and legislation.
4 See also Kahan et al. 2013.
5 $11.2 million over the next two full financial years in comparison to $2 million for the new pro‐
gram. Webber 2012, p. 1; State Budget 2012-13 Service Delivery Statement 2012, p. 4.
6 There were 1,691 court-ordered youth conferencing referrals last year (as well as 1,246 police
referred conferences). Court referred conferencing is reported as having a 98% satisfaction rate.
Childrens Court of Queensland Annual Report 2011-12, p. 7.
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3 The importance of facts in the judicial process
The heart of the lawyers’ craft lies in normative reasoning – the formulation,
interpretation and application of legal rules. In the common law world, appellate
judges are at the pinnacle of that craft in terms of authority and skill. Those jud‐
ges have the ultimate responsibility for authoritatively determining the interpre‐
tation, meaning and effect of statutory and common law texts.
But facts are also important in legal disputes. It is clearly recognized that the par‐
ticular facts alleged and challenged in the matters that come to court constitute
the source of, and the reason for more general rules which are determined
through the judges’ use of inductive and deductive reasoning. These ‘adjudicative
facts’ are the special or particular facts that need to be established in a particular
case and to which legal rules are applied.
In common law systems, the facts are contested. Factual accuracy has been descri‐
bed as the ‘paramount’ (Frankel 1975, p. 1031), ‘fundamental’ (Walker 1996,
p. 1081), ‘principal’ (Koehler & Shaviro 1990. p. 247), ‘necessary,’ ( Twining 1989,
p. 72;) and ‘central’ (Weinstein 1966, p. 223) goal of the trial. Advocates present
two versions of the facts rather than an objective truth. As a general rule, ‘parties
to a court proceeding must prove all facts pertinent to their case’ (Uniform Evi‐
dence Law 2005, 17.1), and there are highly developed rules for determining
these adjudicative facts centring on the laws of evidence, procedure and discovery
(Heydon & Cross 2013). The courts have been said to exercise a gatekeeping role
in keeping out ‘junk science’ through the use of these rules (Odgers & Richard‐
son 1995). A more ‘empirically literate’ profession must surely streamline this
process.
In addition to adjudicative facts, there are ‘empirical facts’ (sometimes called
‘legislative facts’ or ‘social facts’). These consist of ‘assertions of facts about
society, the world and human behaviour’ which, in principle, can be tested by
‘social science or empirical methodologies’ (Burns & Hutchinson 2009,
p. 155-156). These facts are neither pure statements of legal principle nor are
they adjudicative facts – ‘They are assertions used as part of the judicial reasoning
process’.7 Judges can formally take ‘judicial notice’ of ‘notorious facts’ and so
‘relieve the parties of the burden of proving them’ (Heydon & Cross 2013).8 Judi‐
cial notice covers matters of such common knowledge that they are rarely conten‐
tious, for example indisputable scientific, medical, cultural, and historical facts,
including: the laws of physical nature; well-known social habits and usages; and
notorious historical events, such as World War II; as well as matters the court
may be assumed to know already by virtue of its stature and expertise, such as the
validity of legislation put before it (Heydon & Cross 2013, ch. 2).
7 Ibid. See also Burns 2004, p. 215; Burns 2012, p. 317.
8 See Evidence Act1995 (Cth) ss 143, 144 and 145.
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It can be argued that a judge’s view of what is ‘common knowledge’ affects the
interpretations of norms that a judge will find most persuasive. Indeed, views
about the world may be as important to the judge’s choice of the empirical facts
used, as a judge’s general philosophy and approach to judicial reasoning is rele‐
vant to the way they decide cases.9 There have only been a very small number of
studies on the use of empirical facts by Australian courts (Mullane 1998; Sel‐
way 2001). There has been a limited discussion in relation to their use in the Uni‐
ted States (Monahan & Walker 1987; Davis 1942; Davis 1955; Davis 1987).
Research of current Australian, United States and United Kingdom case-law
demonstrates that judges make statements of empirical facts, with or without the
support of social science research, as part of their judicial reasoning. See for
example Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 199 ALR 131 (wrongful birth), Woods v
Multi-Sport Holdings (2002) 208 CLR 460 (extra record social scientific material),
St Helens Borough Council v Derbyshire and others [2007] 3 All ER 81 (working lives
of women) and Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 All ER 929 (Cohabitation),10 and The
Queen v Tang (2008) 237 CLR 1 (slavery).11 Empirical facts may be used in a wide
variety of ways by judges in their reasoning. They may be used to set background
context, in a rhetorical way to support arguments of legal principle, to assist in
the determination or interpretation of adjudicative facts, or as arguments of
policy or consequence used in the development of law (Burns 2004). Sometimes
statements of empirical fact are subsumed into statements of legal or social
values, for example ‘statements that refer to enduring community values such as
the value of human life’ (Burns & Hutchinson 2009, p. 156; Burns 2004,
p. 219-221).
There has been an explosion in social science research on law, the justice system,
the context in which law operates, the effects law has, and the social and instituti‐
onal phenomena that statute law and common law seeks to regulate.12 Nowadays,
many of the ‘home truths’ that might be considered ‘notorious facts’ are subject
to sophisticated social science analysis. Therefore, if this material is available in
the community to judges and clients alike, law schools need to ensure that the
knowledge and skill of critiquing empirical research is not overlooked in legal trai‐
ning.
4 The need for enhanced training for lawyers in undertaking and critiquing
the evidence base
The arguments surrounding the need for lawyers training to be broadened from
purely doctrinal research methodologies so as to engage with social research more
9 For example, a judge who protects consumers’ ability to challenge standard form contracts might
be seen as upholding the principle of consumers’ rights or giving recognition to inequality of bar‐
gaining power.
10 Burns & Hutchinson 2009, p. 155-156. See also the discussion in Burns 2002, p. 234; Mul‐
lane 1998, p. 434.
11 The Queen v Tang (2008) 237 CLR 1; (2008) 249 ALR 200; [2008] HCA 39.
12 See the examples in Cane & Kritzer 2010.
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meaningfully (Curry-Sumner & Van der Schaaf 2011), have been canvassed in the
literature previously (Hutchinson 2008; Bradney 2010). The 2006 UK Nuffield
Inquiry noted the crucial importance of empirical research to lawyers and recom‐
mended that:
xii. (…) all law departments should consider enhancing the undergraduate
curriculum by offering an option on law in society, or offering options with a
significant empirical content (…) This would better equip students to deal
with a world in which there is an increasing demand for assembling and ana‐
lysing social data and where, indeed, legal practice requires a wide range of
research skills in addition to those of the doctrinal lawyer. Such students
should also acquire the technical skills needed to analyse data’ (Genn, Par‐
tington & Wheeler 2006, p. 7).
All law graduates would benefit from this training. In the current milieu, legal
academics are frequently required to take part in interdisciplinary research teams.
Interdisciplinary and multi-faceted methodologies are valued by external granting
authorities such as the Australian Research Council. Higher degree research stu‐
dents require exposure to the array of methodologies in order to choose the most
appropriate way of progressing their research questions and arguments. Even
those researchers using strictly doctrinal methods need to have a facility in asses‐
sing the legal statistics and social context.
Law students need this training for legal practice. Training in empirical methods
will ensure that practicing lawyers have an enhanced ability to locate, read and
critically assess the published results of existing interdisciplinary research and
identify obvious error. The process of evaluation involves reading and assessing
reports of empirical research across the spectrum of quantitative and qualitative
methodologies including for example the use of statistics, surveys, observations
of habitual behaviour and interviews with key players. Such skills are required to
fully assess the abilities and research presented and more knowledgeable in dea‐
ling with expert evidence.
Many law graduates never practice but instead enter government and politics.
Training in empirical research methods will enable this group to become more
skilled in formulating evidence based policy. In Australia for example, prior to the
2013 federal election, 29 per cent (n=66) federal parliamentarians held law
degrees.13 Such trends provide even more reason for the law curriculum to
include adequate exposure to social research methodologies.
Fulfilling a requirement for law students to graduate having achieved an enhan‐
ced knowledge of social research methods and an ability to validly critique the
existing evidence base, is problematic. There are an extensive number of quanti‐
tative and qualitative social research methods. Any treatment of the vast array of
methods within a law degree would necessarily be superficial. Each higher degree
13 This contrasts to a small .452% of the general public who are lawyers. Whitton 2013.
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research student, for example, must determine a data collection method best sui‐
ted to their research question and resources. It would be impossible to cover all
the possibilities in sufficient depth within one undergraduate unit in a law
degree. It may be necessary to limit the skills developed at undergraduate level to
the ability to undertake one very basic quantitative method such as a survey. Is
this an effective use of time?
Who will teach the methods courses within the law degree? Few Australian legal
academics have dual social science and legal qualifications. There is an on-going
discussion even within the social science faculty about the best means of teaching
these methods effectively. In June 2012, the Higher Education Academy led with
the Social Sciences Teaching and Learning Summit: Teaching Research Methods (Ham‐
mersley 2012; MacInnes 2012; Garner 2012). The task is not straightforward.
Will law students welcome having such material being included in the curricu‐
lum? Australian law students (and legal academics) tend to come from a humani‐
ties background and favour text-based studies. Many have not completed advan‐
ced mathematics in their final years at school. Therefore empirical methods will
almost certainly need to be taught by academics from other disciplines. There are
resourcing (and cost) issues involved in such service teaching arrangements
within the universities.
Where should these skills be included in the law degree? In most jurisdictions the
law curriculum is already crowded with core units. In Australia, the core units are
known colloquially as ‘the Priestley Eleven’, being named after the chair of the
Law Admissions Consultative Committee. This committee completed a review of
the requirements for admission to legal practice in Australia in 1992 and this
basic list of subject requirements is still being used throughout Australia.
However, in the Australian law curriculum, the difficulties are not insurmounta‐
ble, and have been canvassed elsewhere (Burns & Hutchinson 2009; Hutchin‐
son 2008). Including empirical research skills within an established incremental
skills training program is one option (Christensen & Kift 2001). Inclusion of such
knowledge and skills beginning with a first year tutorial reading and critique
module would be sufficient to cover basic skills in reading empirical research
papers. Throughout the academic year levels, there are opportunities to examine
examples of empirical research evidence when academics are establishing legal
context prior to analysing the substantive law. Statistics on prison populations
and recidivism are a logical context for a discussion of the rules in relation to sen‐
tencing offenders. Statistics on the incidence of divorce are relevant in a family
law unit. The incidence of consumer complaints is good background to a discus‐
sion of trade practices and fair trading laws. There are case examples which high‐
light where the courts have accepted and used empirical research results.14
14 In Coon and Cox (1993) 17 Fam LR 692; (1994) FLC 92-464 an Australian family law decision, the
Chief Justice of the Family Court compared the scale of the costs of maintaining children, the
‘Lee Scale’, to the scale more commonly used, the ‘Lovering Scale’. See general discussion and
examples in Hale 2013.
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Final year research units provide an additional venue to introduce non-doctrinal
research methodologies. Gradually through individually supervised research pro‐
ject units and Masters or higher degree research, students have opportunities to
be introduced to the art of writing surveys and the importance of university
ethics clearance regulations. The incorporation of discussion of this material is
not onerous and involves organizational emphasis and intention rather than the
displacement of other substantive material.
There are other avenues. The universities already promote combined degree or
dual degree courses such as Law and Justice or Law and Economics. These are
available for those who have an interest in pursuing an interdisciplinary perspec‐
tive. Nevertheless, it is imperative that shifts occur within the law degree curricu‐
lum so that there is more recognition of current research realities. The methodo‐
logies used in research emanating from the law faculties are expanding beyond
purely doctrinal work. The number of higher degree students in law is increasing.
There is a corresponding increase in the number of interdisciplinary methods
being employed by both academics and students at that level (Hutchinson & Dun‐
can, p. 13-14). The time is ripe for change.
5 Conclusion and further work required
This article has argued that facts gleaned from social research form a legitimate
evidence base that should be used to assist legislators in developing and ensuring
well-founded public policies and to assist judges in the development of authorita‐
tive jurisprudence. This argument is in some respects simplistic because it ignores
the complexities involved in the development of a valid evidence base pertinent
to any specific jurisdictional legal problem or specific legal dispute, and it also
ignores the complexities involved in contested legislative reform underlaid by
political reality in democratic government structures. There has not been space to
fully address the larger questions concerning why politicians do not use the
‘museums of official discourse’ effectively within a reasoned law reform process.
The assessment of this broader concern must wait for another venue. This article
maintains that law graduates need enhanced facility in dealing with non-doctrinal
methods so as to fully prepare for legal practice and the many influential roles
lawyers have as advocates, judges, practitioners, legislators, researchers and
policy makers in modern democracies such as Australia.
References
Althaus, Bridgman & Davis 2007
C. Althaus, P. Bridgman & G. Davis, The Australian Policy Handbook, Crows Nest, NSW:




Recht en Methode in onderzoek en onderwijs 2013 (3) 2 61
Terry Hutchinson
Bradney 2010
A. Bradney, ‘The Place of Empirical Legal Research in the Law School Curriculum’, in:
P. Cane & H. Kritzer, The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research, New York:
Oxford University Press 2010.
Burns 2002
K. Burns, ‘It’s Just Not Cricket. The High Court, Sport and Legislative Facts’, Torts Law
Journal 2002, p. 234-254.
Burns 2004
K. Burns, ‘The Way the World Is. Social Facts in High Court Negligence Cases’, Torts
Law Journal 2004, p. 215-238.
Burns 2012
K. Burns, ‘The Australian High Court and Social Facts. A Content Analysis Study’,
Federal Law Review 2012, p. 317-348.
Burns & Hutchinson 2009
K. Burns & T. Hutchinson, ‘Impact of “Empirical Facts” on Legal Scholarship & Trai‐
ning’, The Law Teacher 2009, p. 153-178.
Callinan 2013
I. Callinan, ‘Review of the Parole System in Victoria’, Department of Justice – Correc‐
tions Victoria (July 2013), http://assets.justice.vic.gov.au/corrections/resources/
11ee85a1-67c5-4493-9d81-1ce49941cce5/callinan_review_adultparoleboard.pdf.
Cane & Kritzer 2010
P. Cane & H. Kritzer, The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research, New York:
Oxford University Press 2010.
Childrens Court of Queensland Annual Report 2011-2012 (2012)
Childrens Court of Queensland Annual Report 2011-2012, Queensland Courts 2012, p. 7.
Christensen & Kift 2001
S. Christensen & S. Kift, ‘Graduate Attributes and Legal Skills. Integration or Disinte‐
gration?’, Legal Education Review 2001, p. 207-237.
Curry-Sumner & Van der Schaaf 2011
I. Curry-Sumner & M. van der Schaaf, ‘The Theory and Practice of Teaching and Gui‐
ding Legal Research Skills’, Recht en Methode in onderzoek en onderwijs 2011-1,
p. 64-84.
Davis 1942
K. Davis, ‘An Approach to the Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process’,
Harvard Law Review (55) 1942, p. 364-425.
Davis 1955
K. Davis, ‘Judicial Notice’, Columbia Law Review 1955, p. 945-984.
Davis 1987
P. Davis, ‘“There is a Book out…” An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative
Facts’, Harvard Law Review (100) 1987, p. 1539-1604.
Drake, Aos & Miller 2009
E. Drake, S. Aos & M. Miller, ‘Evidence-Based Public Policy Options to Reduce Crime
and Criminal Justice Costs. Implications in Washington State’, Victims and Offenders
2009, p. 170-196.
Ellickson 2000





62 Recht en Methode in onderzoek en onderwijs 2013 (3) 2
Empirical Facts: A Rationale for Expanding Lawyers’ Methodological Expertise
Fishwick & Bolitho 2010
E. Fishwick & J. Bolitho, ‘Politics-led Policy and Policy-led Evidence. The Noetic
Review of Juvenile Justice in New South Wales’, Current Issues in Criminal Justice
2010-1, p. 171-180.
Frankel 1975
M. Frankel, ‘The Search for Truth. An Umpireal View’, University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 1975, p. 1031-1059.
Garner 2012
M. Garner, ‘There’s Madness in our Methods. The Pedagogical Culture of Research
Methods’, paper presented at Social Sciences Teaching and Learning Summit: Tea‐
ching Research Methods, University of Warwick, 21-22 June 2012.
Genn, Partington & Wheeler 2006
H. Genn, M. Partington & S. Wheeler, Law in the Real World: Improving our Understan‐
ding of How Law Works (Report: Nuffield Foundation, 2006), http://www.nuffield‐
foundation.org/nuffield-inquiry-empirical-legal-research-law-real-world.
Hale 2013
B. Hale, ‘Connections between Practical and Academic Work’, speech given at the ope‐
ning of QUT Law School’s new Centre for the study of Legal Professional Practice, City
University London 2013.
Hammersley 2012
M. Hammersley, ‘Is it Possible to Teach Social Research Methods Well Today?’, paper
presented at Social Sciences Teaching and Learning Summit: Teaching Research
Methods, University of Warwick, 21-22 June 2012.
Head 2010
B. Head, ‘Evidence-based Policy. Principles and Requirements’, in: Productivity Com‐
mission, Strengthening Evidence Based Policy in the Australian Federation, Volume 1:
Proceedings, Roundtable Proceedings, http://www.pc.gov.au/research/conference-
proceedings/strengthening-evidence.
Heydon & Cross 2013
D. Heydon & R. Cross, Cross on Evidence, London: LexisNexis Butterworths 2013.
Hjorland 2011
B. Hjorland, ‘Evidence-Based Practice: An Analysis Based on the Philosophy of Sci‐
ence’, Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology 2011,
p. 1301-1310.
Hutchinson 2008
T. Hutchinson, ‘Developing Legal Research Skills. Context, Framework and Practice’,
Melbourne University Law Review 2008, p. 1083-1087.
Hutchinson 2010
T. Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law, Pyrmont, NSW: Thomson 2010.
Hutchinson & Duncan 2012
T. Hutchinson & N. Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal
Research’, Deakin Law Review 2012, p. [83]-120.
Kahan et al. 2013
D. Kahan et al., ‘Motivated Numeracy and Enlightened Self-Government’, Yale Law
School, The Cultural Cognition Project, Working Paper No 116 (2013).
Koehler & Shaviro 1990
J. Koehler & D. Shaviro, ‘Veridical Verdicts. Increasing Verdict Accuracy through the
Use of Probabilistic Evidence and Methods’, Cornell Law Review 1990, p. 247-279.
 
 
Recht en Methode in onderzoek en onderwijs 2013 (3) 2 63
Terry Hutchinson
Lea 2004
J. Lea, ‘From Brixton to Bradford. Official Discourse on Race and Urban Violence in
the UK’, in: G. Gilligan & J. Pratt (eds.), Crime, Truth and Justice, Cullompton: Willan
Publishing 2004, p. 183-203.
MacInnes 2012
J. MacInnes, ‘Quantitative Methods Teaching in UK Higher Education. The State of
the Field and How it Might Be Improved’, paper presented at Social Sciences Teaching
and Learning Summit: Teaching Research Methods, University of Warwick, 21-22
June 2012.
Monahan & Walker 1987
J. Monahan & L. Walker, ‘Social Frameworks. A New Use of Social Science in Law’,
Virginia Law Review 1987, p. 559-598.
Mullane 1998
G. Mullane, ‘Evidence of Social Science Research’, Australian Law Journal 1998,
p. 434-464.
Nesbit 2013
J. Nesbit, ‘Do Facts Matter Anymore in Public Policy?’ Livescience, 13 September 2013.
Nutley 2003
S. Nutley, ‘Bridging the Policy-Research Divide. Reflections and Lessons from the Uni‐
ted Kingdom’, Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration 2003-10, p. 19-28.
Nutley, Powell & Davies 2013
S. Nutley, A. Powell & H. Davies, Provocation Paper for the Alliance for Useful Evidence
(Research Unit for Research Utilisation (RURU), School of Management, University of
St Andrews, 2013.
Odgers & Richardson 1995
S. Odgers & J. Richardson, ‘Keeping Bad Science out of the Courtroom. Changes in
American and Australian Expert Evidence Law’, University of New South Wales Law
Journal, 1995, p. 108-129.
Rachlinski 2010-2011
J. Rachlinski, ‘Evidence-Based Law’, Cornell Law Review (96) 2010-2011, p. 901-924.
Rudd 2088
K. Rudd, ‘Address by Australian PM to Members Government Senior Executive Ser‐
vice’ (Speech delivered at the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 1
May 2008).
Selway 2001
B. Selway, ‘The Use of History and Other Facts in the Reasoning of the High Court’,
University of Tasmania Law Review 2001, p. 129-158.
Shanahan 2006
T. Shanahan, ‘Legal Scholarship in Ontario’s English-Speaking Common Law Schools’
Canadian Journal of Law and Society 2006, p. 25-50.
State Budget 2012-13 Service Delivery Statement 2012
State Budget 2012-13 Service Delivery Statement, Department of Justice and Attorney-
General, Queensland Government, 2012, p. 4.
Twining 1989
W. Twining, ‘Rationality and Scepticism in Judicial Proof. Some Signposts’, Internatio‐
nal Journal for the Semiotics of Law 1989-2, p. 69-80.
Uniform Evidence Law 2005
Uniform Evidence Law, Australian Law Reform Commission, Report No. 102 (2005),
17.1.
 
64 Recht en Methode in onderzoek en onderwijs 2013 (3) 2
Empirical Facts: A Rationale for Expanding Lawyers’ Methodological Expertise
Walker 1996
V. Walker, ‘Preponderance, Probability and Warranted Fact-finding’, Brooklyn Law
Review 1996, p. 1075-1136.
Washington 2011a
S. Washington, ‘Tainted Evidence. Science in the Dock’, Sydney Morning Herald 17
December 2011, p. 1.
Washington 2011b
S. Washington, ‘Appeals Spark Concern over Use of Scientific Evidence’, Sydney Mor‐
ning Herald 17 December 2011, p. 5.
Webber 2012
A. Webber, ‘Youth Justice Conferences versus Children’s Court. A Comparison of
Cost-effectiveness’, Contemporary Issues in Crime and Justice 2012, no. 164, p. 1-8.
Weinstein 1966
J. Weinstein, ‘Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in Judicial
Trials’, Columbia Law Review 1966, p. 223-246.
Whitton 2013
E. Whitton, ‘The Parliament of Australia(nlawyers)’, http://www.independentaustra‐
lia.net/2013/politics/the-parliament-of-australian-lawyers/.
Wilson, MacKenzie & Mitchell 2008
D. Wilson, D. MacKenzie & F. Mitchell, ‘Effects of Correctional Boot Camps on Offen‐
ding’, Report, The Campbell Collaboration 2008, p. 3.
Ziegler 1988
P. Ziegler, ‘A General Theory of Law as a Paradigm for Legal Research’, The Modern
Law Review 1988, p. 569-592.
Recht en Methode in onderzoek en onderwijs 2013 (3) 2 65
‘I’d like to learn what hegemony means’
Teaching International Law from a Critical Angle
Christine E.J. Schwöbel-Patel
‘It is a fucking TRADE SCHOOL. You are all there to be trained to think and act
exactly the same way as everyone else in the profession, so you can then be a drone
in the legal system.’(Tucker Max, excerpt from ‘Why You Should Not Go to Law
School’1)
Introduction
International law teaching is largely dedicated to the idea of training students to
acquire a language of expertise employed in international legal organisations.
Such training is causing the reproduction of a cultural hegemony in the class‐
room, in the law school, and society at large. In the following, I investigate
whether there is a possibility (and an obligation) for teachers of international law
to disrupt this reproduction, to be counter-hegemonic in their teaching. The term
‘cultural hegemony’ was coined by Antonio Gramsci to denote the actions of a
ruling class which constructs particular cultural norms, sustaining and endorsing
them as natural and inevitable, for the purposes of domination. There is an
emphasis on ruling by consent rather than simply through force
(Gramsci 1971/2007). Gramsci dedicated his writing, particularly in The Prison
Notebooks, to exposing the accepted cultural norms as artificial social constructs,
put into place and sustained through particular institutions, practices, and
beliefs.2 In Gramsci’s view, education is central to understanding hegemony, sig‐
nalling ‘every relationship of “hegemony” is necessarily an educational relation‐
ship’ (Gramsci 1971/2007, p. 350). Applying this analytical frame to the practices
involved in teaching international law, the question is: Is the dominant form of
practice-oriented international law teaching producing and reproducing the
dominance of a particular class of lawyers who privilege individualism, the ‘global
North’, males, whites, and an ideology of neoliberalism? And, is this cultural
hegemony presented and perceived as natural and inevitable?
My own reflection on teaching international law from a critical angle was deci‐
dedly inspired by a teaching workshop I organized as part of the Critical Approa‐
ches to International Criminal Law conference in December 2012. In the modest
1 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tucker-max/law-school_b_2713943.html, accessed 21 July
2013.
2 Michael A. Peters explains hegemony in Gramsci’s sense as ‘an essential part of the sociology of
capitalist society enabling an understanding of the manufacture of consent by the powerful
through the institution of cultural values’ (Peters 2010, p. ix).
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preparation for the workshop and during the course of the day, the question of
the extent of the politics of teaching became increasingly prominent. The work‐
shop, on the third day of a three-day conference, was organized for a group of
like-minded lecturers in order to consider how to teach international criminal law
(ICL) from a critical perspective. Like-minded here refers to a group of colleagues
who are concerned with foregrounding issues of hegemony, inequality, power
imbalances, biases, and limitations in and of international criminal law in their
research. The discussion soon drifted towards the more general question of how
to teach (law) in a critical fashion. Emotions ran high. It seemed to me, and trou‐
bled me, that a left critical agenda in research was apparently one matter, tea‐
ching in this vein to students was another. It surprized me how divisive the topic
was. Some colleagues felt obligations and restrictions imposed through their
institutions, others felt constrained by the expectations of students. One friend
and colleague even provocatively said to me ‘good luck with getting a promotion
with that agenda’. I am, admittedly, as much implicated in the concern about
institutional and academic restraints, and probably just as complicit in the repro‐
duction of the existing unequal structures as the next person – but, I think that
this should not spell defeat in terms of a critical, maybe even radical, outlook on
teaching.
Apart from my own complicity, I should set out some further disclaimers: Alt‐
hough much of what is mentioned below could be equally valid in the context of
school, even nursery school, education, I will largely draw on my experience in
higher education. An additional disclaimer regards my inadequate expertise in
pedagogy. Perhaps problematically, higher education teachers are not, or only in a
very limited way, expected to engage with the science of learning theories and
processes. In general, the expectation is that if you have researched in an area (or
did well in that area in your own exams), you are also able to teach it. Researching
even superficially on pedagogy has unveiled a rich tradition of thought and an
enormous literature of which I have merely been able to reference small parts.
It should be noted from the outset that the audience I refer to here is not limited
to teachers/lecturers/educators3 of law. When I speak to a ‘we’ in the following, so
an audience to which I include myself, I mean all teachers and students of law,
and in particular international law. Much can be said about teaching ICL from a
critical perspective (about its focus on individual accountability, the simplified
narratives of ‘goodie’ and ‘baddie’, the lack of political, religious, and social con‐
text, the North/South divide of responsibility, and so on), but, this contribution
focuses on more general questions of pedagogy in higher education, teaching law,
and particularly teaching international law.
In the following, I begin by setting out the stakes of the current trajectory of edu‐
cation as determined by neoliberal precepts. I then consider Duncan Kennedy’s
piece on ‘Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy’, placing it within
today’s higher education systems. From this emerges that (the majority of) Ken‐
3 I use these terms interchangeably.
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nedy’s key concerns are still as salient today as they were 30 years ago. I then turn
to international law by drawing on a piece by Anne Orford in which she interroga‐
tes the depoliticization of international lawyers, achieved through their discipli‐
ning. From these two sections I take that legal education in its focus on training is
causing the cementing of an existing hegemony, meaning that the interests of the
most powerful social groups are constantly reaffirmed (Mayo 2010, p. 22). My
modest suggestion, which can only touch upon rudimentaries, is for a considera‐
tion of the German word Bildung in relation to teaching (international) law from a
critical angle. Bildung, as opposed to training, encompasses a sense of activity
rather than passivity; it includes the idea of reflexiveness and critique. I suggest
that this notion of Bildung may be a starting point for a counter-hegemonic
approach to teaching law, and in particular international law.
1 The stakes
I would like to use some of the introductory space to set out what I think may be
at stake if (international) (law) education continues along the current trajectories.
We could imagine the international law classroom as existing within different
spheres of influence. The sphere of the law school, the faculty, the university, the
domestic state’s educational system, the domestic state’s larger political and ideo‐
logical system, the regional (inter-national) education and political system, and
then the global sphere. Each sphere influences the other and highlights different
stakes. There are numerous issues which could be explored here; I want to high‐
light just one stake per sphere, conceding that they may overlap and are in part
artificially segregated for the purpose of clarification and argument, and forewar‐
ning that these thoughts will be fleshed out more in the following sections.
Proceeding from the global to the local: future international lawyers who are
taught today will enter international legal organizations, or other legal outfits
(law firms, governments) with a certain influence and a particular notion of ‘how
the world works’. Teachers of international law students are teaching a global
elite, a global class, which carries ideas of the law into their work and private lives.
While already coming to university as fully-formed individuals with preferences,
dislikes, and sympathies, they are unlikely to have formed a definitive idea of the
law, and the law in society. Along the current trajectories, international law is
taught as a set of norms which have universal currency and are there to reign in
power-politics. This liberal notion of international law, while enchanting, is predi‐
cated on a number of assumptions which privilege individualism over more social
ideas, the ‘global North’ over the ‘global South’, male over female, white over non-
white, neoliberal over social ideology. In Gramsci’s sense, an elite class of interna‐
tional lawyers has manipulated the system of values within international law in
order to establish its own Weltanschauung as the dominant one. International
lawyers of tomorrow sustain and reproduce the status quo by viewing this domi‐
nation as natural and the paradigms as neutral and universal.4
4 This is in reference to Marx and Engels in Die Deutsche Ideologie.
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On the regional level, the reproduction of historical biases is at stake, particularly
so in Europe. The spheres of influence in international law, although arguably
shifting from the previously exclusive eurocentric, is nevertheless unarguably ori‐
ginated and entrenched in eurocentric enlightenment ideas. The centres and clus‐
ters of international law teaching (London and other parts of England, the Net‐
herlands, the East Coast of the US, Southern Germany, Melbourne and Sydney)
are reproducing these eurocentric enlightenment ideas and presenting them as
global.5
State politics is an important sphere of influence for students of international law
since it is to a great extent state politics which determines the attitude to, or the
culture of, education. Commitments to neoliberalism are becoming more evident
in higher education – prompting a move away from educations’ former place in
the public sphere. The political economy of education has become central. David
Harvey’s work on neoliberalism is instructive for pinning down some of its cen‐
tral themes. In particular, Harvey states that a cardinal feature of neoliberal thin‐
king is ‘the assumption that individual freedoms are guaranteed by freedom of
the market and of trade’ (Harvey 2007, p. 7).
Students are largely viewed as consumers; universities are viewed as competing in
a global marketplace, with franchised universities becoming more common, parti‐
cularly in the so-called emerging markets; education is being ‘sold’ as a financial
investment in the future; universities are trying to meet customer demand by
changing their syllabi and training foci. In the UK, the commitment to neolibera‐
lism has become sharpened with the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition
government. All in all, higher education has become commodified and marketized
(Canaan & Shumar 2008). It appears that this is not only the case in the free-mar‐
ket centres of Europe and Northern America, but also ‘the South’ (Naidoo 2008;
Amsler 2008; Mamdani 2007).
Neoliberalism has assumed world-wide scope. Harvey places the globalization of
neoliberalism in the late 1970s, early 1980s, with Deng Xiaoping’s liberalization
policies in China, Paul Volcker’s taking command of the US Federal Reserve, Mar‐
garet Thatcher’s mandate to curb trade union power, and Ronald Reagan’s politi‐
cal and economic endeavours (Harvey 2007, p. 1, 2). The reach of neoliberalism
has sharpened further since the financial crisis and the consequent funding cuts
across the public sector. Meanwhile, the limitations of free market capitalism
have also become more evident, with Eurozone sovereign debt crises being a case
in point. At stake in regard to universities is the understanding of the university
as a place outside of a market logic, in which knowledge can be more than simply
a means to acquiring particular skills for securing a particular profession.
Universities have political orientations too, some openly, some less openly. In the
US, affiliations with certain traditions of thought, and certain attitudes towards
5 The recent so-called ‘turn to history’ in international law has sought to bring attention to such
biases as well as challenge the accepted history of international law.
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pedagogy, are perhaps most evident. In my experience, it is also possible to distin‐
guish between more conservative and more liberal institutions in Europe. By con‐
servative I mean an affinity with doctrine and sympathies with political (read
governmental) actors; while being more liberal-minded denotes an affinity with
rights-discourse and sympathies with individual (read non-governmental) actors.
And, by this distinguisher, students in the Netherlands are more conservative
than those in the UK and students in the South of England are more conservative
than in the North. This can then, in a very generalized manner, be mapped onto
the respective institutions whereby students at Leiden University are more con‐
servative than students at the University of Liverpool. Within the UK, a distin‐
guishing factor may be the designation of a university as Russell Group, i.e., an
institution which foregrounds research,6 and non-Russell Group institutions,
many of them the former polytechnics which often foreground (although not
exclusively so) teaching and training (Freedman 2011, p. 1-2). The Russell Group
was formed in 1994 as a response to the 1992 government policy to eliminate the
binary divide between universities and polytechnics. Joyce E. Canaan argues that
by once again distinguishing themselves from the rest, the Russell Group have re-
stratified the seemingly levelled playing field (Canaan 2013, p. 25). Russell Group
students tend to be the elite privately educated students, while non-Russell
Group universities are largely attended by students from working class back‐
grounds. At the same time, needless to say, student groups are not homogenous.
Yet, at stake in the contemporary trajectory of neoliberal universities is that there
is no longer a space for universities committed to bridging social inequalities in a
meaningful way.
The seemingly most significant influence of the attitude of law schools is in how
far they are, or allow themselves to be, steered by the professions. This occurs
through influences both on the law syllabus (which subjects are ‘core’ subjects)
and in terms of requirements of employability skills. The more this is so, the
more a tradition of training rather than teaching, of technical expertise rather
than critical thought, is established. The stakes here will be further explored
below, but they crucially include the understanding of law as a discipline which is
socially relevant. Students come to law school to be trained, expecting the incul‐
cation of a particular expertise; they largely do not come to law school to under‐
stand the underlying social structures of the law.
The final sphere of influence, the international law classroom, is directed prima‐
rily by the teacher and his or her pedagogy. Subject to further investigation
below, international law lecturers are surrendering to the aforementioned sphe‐
res of influence and are furthering a cultural hegemony which is enabled through
submission to a neoliberal market logic. Lecturers submit to this due to, first,
their own education of international law, and, second, because they are discipli‐
ned to teach in this way. The disciplining of international lawyers relates to the
combination of subjection to the discipline (Threadgold 1996), as well as a culture
6 http://www.russellgroup.ac.uk/our-universities/, accessed 21 July 2013.
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of accountability imposed on them (Shore & Wright 2000, p. 57-89). The primary
driving force of cultural hegemony is the teaching of (international) law, and its
language, as a technical discipline. The understanding of international law’s own
hegemonic tendencies, as well as its possible counter-hegemonic properties, are
therefore left underexplored.
In this diagnosis of the spheres of influence, knowledge is a means to a particular
end, both from the perspective of the students (securing a job) as well as for the
teacher (getting promotions). At the more complicated partly unconscious cultu‐
ral level, the end is a reproduction of the existing power imbalances.
2 Teaching law
In 1982, Duncan Kennedy published ‘Legal Education and the Reproduction of
Hierarchy’. In this piece, Kennedy interrogates the US law school as a site in
which hierarchies are both manifested and reproduced (Kennedy 1982, p. 591).
He begins with a description of a typical first-year law school experience. His exa‐
mination spans the classroom experience (‘the teachers are overwhelmingly
white, male, and deadeningly straight and middle class in manner’ (p. 593)), the
pressures of performance (‘performance is on one’s mind, adrenalin flows, suc‐
cess has a nightly and daily meaning in terms of the material suggested’ (ibid.)),
and the intellectual experience. The intellectual experience includes the revelation
that there is no purchase for left or even for committed liberal thinking: ‘The
basic experience is of double surrender: to a passivizing classroom experience and
to a passive attitude toward the content of the legal system’ (p. 594).
In his analysis, the thesis particularly stands out that much of this approach to
law and legal teaching comes about through an artificial distinction between law
and policy. Such a distinction lies at the intellectual core of the ideological con‐
tent of legal education (p. 596). Lecturers teach law in a way which presumes that
legal reasoning exists, moreover that it exists as a rational neutral practice, and
that it is different from policy analysis. Policy analysis is the only outlet for unco‐
vering indeterminacy and for biased decisions. Public policy is that which high‐
lights the indeterminacy and manipulability of ideas and institutions central to
liberalism (ibid.). Contract law, tort law, land law, criminal law, are all taught as
though they had an inner logic. Kennedy highlights that these are not random
subjects built on the foundation of neutral reasoning, but are ‘the ground-rules of
late nineteenth-century laissez-faire capitalism’ (p. 597). The primacy of property
and restrictions on interference with the market are foregrounded as central
values. The relevant rights are those reflecting the interests of private property
owners, businesses, multinational corporations and financial capital. Through the
idea of the ‘inner logic’, law is bestowed with an almost magical, and certainly
mysterious, authority. The authority of the law is mirrored by the authority of the
lecturer who imparts knowledge on the basis that his or her authority is preser‐
ved. Students mimic such authority, both of the law and of the individual who has
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the knowledge to impart the law. Ultimately, students learn to embody establis‐
hed hierarchies without questioning them.
Kennedy’s description of a US law school in the 1980s is an equally accurate
description of many law schools in the world today. Certainly, it seems particu‐
larly familiar to the law schools in the UK, where the three year law course is hea‐
vily influenced by the professions. The subjects required by the legal profession
are compulsory subjects on the degree programme so that completion of the
degree will also satisfy the requirements of the professional bodies. There is a
tacit understanding of the distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ modules. The for‐
mer include the core modules of contract law, tort law, criminal law, law of trusts,
commercial law; the latter include modules such as family law, human rights law,
legal theory. Soft subjects are often feminized and infantilized (Orford 1998,
p. 18). Syllabi are increasingly skills-focused, emphasizing communication skills,
team work and critical analysis.7 Notwithstanding the importance of such skills,
understanding and analysing the role of law in society, even regarding law as a
social language, have disappeared and have given way to the training of professio‐
nals who will fit in well with a market-focussed legal practice.8 As the epigraph
provocatively states: law schools are in this sense trade schools.
It is worth noting the German law school as a possible counter-example. In Ger‐
many, the Rechtswissenschaften, legal science, is historically and at present less
focused on professionalization, although it appears to be moving in the professio‐
nalization and training direction. The education sector at large is relevant: in Ger‐
many, students only pay a nominal administration fee per semester rather than
the, to some extent, crippling fees in the UK and the US.9 While the first year of
legal education will include contract law, it commonly also includes legal philoso‐
phy and Roman law. Rather than being viewed as the ‘soft’ subjects, these are
incorporated into syllabi in the same rigorous way as, say, contract law or crimi‐
nal law. As a result, the exams in those subjects are not set up to be easier as a
mark of the lecturers’ gratitude that students have picked their subject.
However, not all is rosy at German universities. An estimated 90 per cent of Ger‐
man law students complement their university studies with a private ‘Repetito‐
rium’,10 a hand-full of companies in Germany who charge high fees for prepara‐
tion for the notoriously difficult exams. They market themselves on the basis that
7 Critical analysis does not refer to an understanding of the underlying assumptions of the law or
its place within society at large, rather it refers to the ability of students to make pro and contra
arguments. Critical analysis encompasses the skill of identifying the conflicting principles – usu‐
ally two or three (one conservative, one liberal, one in the middle). At the end, these conflicting
principles are simply ‘balanced away’ (Kennedy 1970-1971, p. 84).
8 Campaign for the Public University at http://publicuniversity.org.uk/, accessed 21 July 2013.
9 Fees of around €1,000 per semester were introduced in most Bundesländer after 2005 (when the
Federal Constitutional Court rescinded the ban on tuition fees). However, eight years later, these
have largely been abandoned (www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/news/unbridled-success-germa
nys-fee-foes-claim-victory/2003928.article, accessed 21 July 2013).
10 www.juraindividuell.de/blog/notwendigkeit-juristischer-repetitorien/, accessed 21 July 2013.
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university lectures emphasize academic research while the exams require skills for
solving cases. To bridge this disjuncture, students pay around €2000 per year to
learn how to solve cases in the exams.11 And the exam results determine the job,
and income.12
What the UK, the US and Germany certainly have in common is a largely decrepit
left programme in the law schools. In 1982, Duncan Kennedy stated: ‘Most liberal
students believe that the left program can be reduced to guaranteeing people
their rights, and to bringing about the triumph of human rights over mere pro‐
perty rights’ (1982, p. 598). Kennedy observed this as worrying given that the
rights discourse presupposes, or takes for granted, that the world is and should be
divided between the public and the private. The state sector, the public, enforces
rights; and the private world of ‘civil society’ is one in which atomized individuals
pursue their diverse goals. The site of the political then exists exclusively in the
public sphere. Individuals are distanced, even alienated, from this sphere. Relying
purely on the language of rights possibly subjects the left to complicity in the con‐
struction of a distinction between law and politics; and with this, the seeming
neutrality of the law. Kennedy’s conclusion is that ‘rights discourse is a trap’
(ibid). Regardless of whether one agrees with his conclusions, the left programme
as a meaningful alternative certainly is a neglected site.
3 Teaching international law
As with the distinction between law and policy in foundational law courses, a
general public international law course teaches students that there is a distinction
between law and politics. For example, the 2003 Iraq war is generally taught as
the political manipulation which then led to the war being ‘illegal’. The Bush Doc‐
trine, which according to US reasoning extended the exception of self-defence to
pre-emptive self-defence, is regarded as political manipulation of the law. Against
this, international law is introduced as the voice of reason and neutrality which
(more or less successfully) reigns in excesses of politics.
In such rhetoric, both the law and the student are depoliticized. Law is portrayed
as the rational, neutral, voice. The complicity of law in its commitment to a parti‐
cular liberal ideology is obscured. This in itself is a politically motivated move: the
depoliticization of law is political.
Orford refers to this process as ‘disciplining’, drawing both on Michel Foucault’s
work of ‘technologies of the self’ and feminist theorist Terry Threadgold. Fou‐
11 www.faz.net/aktuell/rhein-main/wirtschaft/repetitorien-fuer-jurastudenten-recht-verschlossen-
1642387.html, accessed 21 July 2013.
12 Hemmer, the most popular Repetitor in Germany, markets its services with the promise of higher
points in the exams. It claims that each point from seven onwards (18 are attainable, the average
is around 6) means an extra €1,000 in salary per month (www.faz.net/aktuell/rhein-main/wirt
schaft/repetitorien-fuer-jurastudenten-recht-verschlossen-1642387.html, accessed 21
July 2013).
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cault’s idea of technologies of the self is that the self exists as an effect of power
relations, making individuals to ‘subjects’ (Foucault 1988). Threadgold’s work
highlights how the process of being trained in a discipline involves the belief,
reproduction, guarding and passing on of the narratives at the heart of the disci‐
pline (Threadgold 1996, p. 281). Orford begins her analysis of ‘disciplining’ with
legal education – as the primary site in which the self-image of international lawy‐
ers is produced (Orford 1998, p. 15). She is particularly interested in the writing,
reading and performing of narratives of intervention by international lawyers.
She singles out four aspects of intervention narratives which ‘in particular shape
the sense of self of international lawyers’ (p. 5). First, New world order professio‐
nals, a role attributed to international lawyers which portrays them as manageria‐
lists, ‘pragmatic, problem-solving professionals, striding the corridors of power
and being involved in history-making events’ (ibid). Second, Agents of humanitari‐
anism, those international lawyers who are ‘humanitarians, saving victims of
oppression and human rights abuses’ (p. 8). Third, Gentle civilisers, an image of
‘international lawyers as humane, professional, elite advisers to real decision-
makers’ (p. 11). And fourth, Men of action, professionals who ‘do something’ in a
difficult and torn world which requires decision-making, not dithering. In sum,
‘international lawyers come to understand themselves as the embodiment of her‐
oic internationalism, and of the values and myths that underlie international law’
(p. 16). And who is this disciplined ‘subject’ of law according to Orford? ‘The “sub‐
ject” of law is an aggressive, capitalist, heterosexual, white man’ (p. 17). In this
disciplining and in this technology of the self, legal education is political; it is an
exercise of reproduction of power relations, at the same time as being declared
non-political. Such training, or disciplining, of both teacher and student reprodu‐
ces the cultural hegemony in all above-mentioned spheres of influence.
Not all students buy into this depoliticization – the student ‘body’ is by no means
homogenous and students are not to be understood as simply passive recipients.
There are some who are suspicious of the role of the law. Yet, often, what they
learn to do with this suspicion is to package it away into their private lives – it is
seen as having no place in the professional, legal, sphere (Kennedy 1982,
p. 608).13 So even those students who could have a potential political agenda,
save this for a space outside of law.
Is it therefore the role of the educator to expose these politics and shift the
(self-)understanding of the role of lawyers? The spheres of influence show that
the problem is both systemic as well as lying at an individual level. We are wor‐
king in a neoliberal world, which the education system is largely committed to;
legal education will therefore privilege the cardinal features of neoliberalism: indi‐
vidualism, competition, growth, and an idea of the guaranteeing of freedom
through free markets and trade. But there are also ways in which education
13 Kennedy already mentioned this in a piece he wrote as a student at Yale Law School: ‘[T]he divi‐
sion of life into hermetically sealed “private” (emotional) and “public” (effectiveness) compart‐
ments must lead to deformations in both areas.’ (Kennedy 1970-1971, p. 77, 78).
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should be able to extricate itself from such market logic and this is where, poten‐
tially, individual educators come into play.
4 Bildung
From the above, it emerges that the problem at the teaching level is one of focu‐
sing excessively on training students. Education is instrumentalized for the indi‐
vidual. Training is part of the reproduction of cultural hegemony since it does not
encourage reflection. In subscribing to training our students, we are ultimately
subscribing to a particular exercise of power: one that emanates from viewing stu‐
dents as consumers, in a university of political economy. We are furthering an
individualized, rather than a social, idea of teaching, treating knowledge as a
means to a particular individual end.
Let us begin where Kennedy begins: if the distinction between law and policy and
between law and politics is at the heart of the ideology of teaching which reprodu‐
ces such cultural hegemony, the first step to teaching from a critical angle would
be to introduce ideas of indeterminacy, bias, and manipulability to the law.
This is not about indoctrination of radical thought. Crucially, one type of hege‐
mony must not be substituted with another. There must be a process in which
both educator and student participate, with flexibility as to their roles. ‘Educa‐
tion’, or even ‘teaching’ and ‘training’ are terms with limited potential in this
regard since they imply a one-way relationship. That between The Educator, The
Teacher, The Trainer and the object The Educated, The Taught, The Trained.
The German word, and notion of, Bildung is perhaps useful since it captures a
wider notion of education. It is a word which implies activity rather than passi‐
vity. Dörpinghaus et al. (2012) note two interconnected attributes which are cen‐
tral to the understanding of Bildung: first, Bildung relates to a complex relation‐
ship of self, the other, and the world; second, it relates to critical reflexivity. By
this they mean that the relationships of self, the other, and the world are no neu‐
tral formulae, that they are thought and language processes (reflexive) which are
differentiated and questioned (critique). Their understanding of Bildung is a dis‐
course, mediated through differentiation, thought, and language, of the indivi‐
dual with oneself, with others, and the world (Dörpinghaus et al. 2012, p. 10).
Such an idea of Bildung can be attributed to Hegel who believed in an organic
understanding of education (Hegel 1807/1977). Education according to Hegel is
the developmental formation of an individuals’ unique potential through partici‐
pation in society. Norms, beliefs, and values, constantly growing, are reflected
back through immanent critique and active reconstruction of such cultural
norms, beliefs, and values, affecting others and their Bildung (Good 2006, p. xix).
Bildung, then, is to be understood as a social activity.14
14 See also Gramsci ‘On Education’ in Selections from the Prison Notebooks, who claims that the aim
should be to ‘insert young men and women into social activity’ (Gramsci 1971/2007, p. 29).
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However, some caution is also necessary. The etymology of the word, according to
Schilling, reveals that Bildung derives from Bildnis which can best be translated as
‘image’ or ‘effigy’. Bildung has, so Schilling, theological roots in that it was first
conceived of as ‘living in the image of God’, zum Ebenbilde Gottes (Schilling 1961).
With this in mind, Bildung concerns not only the relationship of an individual
towards knowledge and society, but a relationship towards God, an entity embo‐
dying universal knowledge – a strict and unbreachable hierarchy is implied. Since
secular displacements of God nearly always mean re-entrenchments of hierar‐
chies elsewhere, Bildung must, if it is to serve as a useful interpretative tool, be
dislodged from a sense of hierarchy, certainly from an idea of a locus of universal
knowledge. Yet, how to address the inherent hierarchy of teacher to student?
John Dewey’s work may provide some rudimentary points of departure. Dewey,
often referred to as a scholar of the philosophy of education (Garrison, Neubert &
Reich 2012), was particularly critical of the idea of vocational education as job
training (Dewey 1915, 411f). He was wary of the instrumentalism of knowledge,
suggesting that this fostered an alienation from larger societal issues. According
to Dewey, learning was an intensely social process, and it was paramount for him
to put that into practice.15 In 1896, Dewey and his wife set up a school, the Uni‐
versity Elementary School, in Chicago which foregrounded learning through expe‐
rience. The aim was to discover ‘how a school could become a cooperative commu‐
nity’. Children learn through experimenting in a learning environment composed
of materials, workshops, library and school gardens; they learn about themselves
cooperating in and with their environment. The teacher was not viewed in the
role of the domineering instructor, but rather as a co-worker. This is not to say
law schools should follow the Dewey model, but it highlights that the displace‐
ment of the hierarchy can and has been achieved in other stages of education. It is
also an instructive example of the relationship between practice and theory in cri‐
tique, in that critique is not merely to be implemented through theory.
A further concern about Bildung is that it can be used as a class differentiator
rather than an equalizer. Particularly in Germany, this is (historically) the case.
Writing in 1885, Friedrich Paulsen stated:
‘Formerly, one distinguished between aristocratic and middle-class bourgeois
(bürgerlich), between believers and non-believers, between Catholics and Pro‐
testants, Christians and Jews. There are still memories present of these, but
the practically important, the significant distinction is between Gebildeten
and Ungebildeten’ (Paulsen 1885, p. 658; my translation).
The passage is a reference to the new class of European professionals (professors,
teachers, doctors, lawyers, merchants, musicians) which first appeared in the
eighteenth century. In Germany, this class was, and often still is, referred to as
the Bildungsbürgertum, the Bildungs-(middle-bourgeois) class. At the time of the
15 www.ucls.uchicago.edu/data/files/gallery/HistoryBookDownloadsGallery/chapter1_3.pdf, acces‐
sed 21 July 2013.
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beginning of the industrial revolution, the Bildungsbürgertum was distinguished
from the Wirtschaftsbürgertum, the economic middle-bourgeois class. Although
the idea of social mobility through education is at the heart of this class, again,
caution must be taken that Bildung does not simply become a new site of reprodu‐
cing hierarchies. In this context it is noteworthy that Paulsen’s ultimate aim was
arguably to foster an ideal which was to serve the nation state, the German state
as the superior state.16
How can a counter-hegemonic approach through Bildung be translated into higher
education? Kennedy’s strategy, provoking thoughts of a Bildungsbürgertum, is for
‘building a left bourgeois intelligentsia that might one day join together with a
mass movement for the radical transformation of American society’ (Ken‐
nedy 1982, p. 610). Canaan has highlighted the importance of critical pedagogy,
outlining the understandings of the Critical Pedagogy Collective (Canaan 2013,
p 34-44). Drawing on Freire (and reminiscent of Dewey), Canaan notes that the
assumption of critical pedagogy is that of the students as ‘knowers guiding tea‐
ching’ (p. 36). Students and teachers are ‘co-investigators in dialogue’
(Freire 1970/2005, p. 62).
There is something distinctly appealing about such an idea of Bildung – it is a
social as well as political idea of Bildung. Harmut von Hentig wrote a notable essay
in 1996 in which he places Bildung in the context of politics from antiquity (von
Hentig 2009, p. 205-210). Von Hentig explains that a privileged education
brought with it a responsibility to engage in the Greek polis as well as in the
Roman res publica. As Dörpinghaus et al. comment, such an approach to Bildung
may appear alien to us: in today’s world, we have replaced social engagement and
common responsibility with our individual needs and our ‘self’ (Dörpinghaus et
al. 2012, p. 39). For such an idea of Bildung to take hold, we must aim to rethink
the deeply entrenched (liberal) notions of individualism.
Although it would be subscribing to a myth to claim that intellectuals (students
and educators) are independent of class (Gramsci 1971/2007, p. 1-23), a notion
of Bildung at least enables flexibility within this class, makes it more sensitized to
the inequalities it creates and reproduces. A further myth is that there is no ele‐
ment of training in Bildung. It would be erroneous to claim that they are polar
opposites; rather, Bildung complements training. Gramsci warned against an
excessive emphasis on the distinction between ‘instruction’ and ‘education’,
which can be mapped onto ‘training’ and ‘Bildung’ respectively: ‘For instruction to
be wholly distinct from education, the pupil would have to be pure passivity, a
“mechanical receiver” of abstract notions – which is absurd’ (p. 36).
Students come with a certain ‘baggage’, as Gramsci calls it, of previous education
acquired, but also crucially from the sector of civil society in which they partici‐
pate, within the social relations of their family, neighbourhood. And it is this
16 http://politische-bildung-sh.de/friedrich-paulsen/, accessed 21 July 2013.
Recht en Methode in onderzoek en onderwijs 2013 (3) 2 77
Christine E.J. Schwöbel-Patel
‘baggage’ which needs to be brought to the fore (not repressed) in the engage‐
ment with self, the other, and the world.
Translating a political, social, organic notion of Bildung to the law classroom
involves, above all, the contextualization of norms. In ICL, for example, a deep
interrogation of the principle of individual accountability would be required:
What are the historical, religious, ideological, and political reasons for foregroun‐
ding the responsibility of those individuals? Could the focus on individual
accountability be having wider social and societal impacts? Such a study would
require the incorporation of anthropology, criminology, sociology, perhaps psy‐
chology – disciplines which work with empirical research methods. This would
mean a displacement of the law as neutral and objective, demonstrating that law
is shaped by considerations other than rationality and logic. Perhaps such contex‐
tualization could be central for a counter-hegemonic culture of international law
teaching.
5 Constraints on educators
The constraints on educators in regard to counter-hegemonic teaching are wide-
ranging, although not so wide-ranging to justify complete inability to act/resist.
First, the constraints come from the above-mentioned spheres of influence. As
Gramsci wrote in his essay ‘On Education’: ‘The problem was not one of model
curricula but of men, and not just of the men who are actually teachers themsel‐
ves but of the entire social complex which they express’ (Gramsci 1971/2007,
p. 26).
Given the neoliberal commitments of higher education, in how far can an educa‐
tor make an argument if it is at logger-heads with such a commitment? Will they
lose their jobs? Their influence? Their gravitas? In the following, I have singled
out institutional restraints (which stand alongside historical, social and societal
restraints) as that which may be felt with the most intensity. Student surveys on
teaching performance, university league tables, decisions on promotions, are all
means by which the notorious ‘academic freedom’ may at times appear farcical.
In 2000, Cris Shore and Susan Wright named the audit culture in higher educa‐
tion ‘coercive accountability’ (Shore and Wright 2000). They argued that proces‐
ses of auditing have been transferred from the financial domain to the public sec‐
tor. This includes the incorporation of terms of the new managerialism, a vocabu‐
lary of audit, such as ‘performance’, ‘quality assurance’, ‘quality control’, ‘accoun‐
tability’ etc. (p. 60).
The most pressing question in regard to ensuring the ‘quality control’ of teaching
through student surveys and peer-review relates to the teaching of doctrine. Does
teaching in a critical manner allow for the teaching of doctrine? Teaching in a cri‐
tical manner can be approached from one of two ways. One approach is to teach
the doctrine and then ‘slip in the theory’. Kennedy suggests that politicizing the
classroom must begin with black letter law: ‘I see myself as having a major res‐
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ponsibility to teach doctrine’ (Kennedy 1994-1995, p. 81). He fears otherwise
that he may ‘lose the students’. Annelise Riles has written about teaching pro‐
perty law from the perspective of an anthropologist, viewing the relevant case as
a cultural text to be interpreted discursively for their cultural meanings
(Riles 2004, p. 779). She attempted to teach a case by unpacking wider political
and cultural issues, but soon sensed her control over the classroom slipping away
(p. 780). On asking a colleague, he advised to ‘slip the theory in’; students would
not accept a ‘theoretical orientation’ (ibid). She learns that ‘it was doctrine that
needed to emerge from the cases, not relations of ownership and their meanings’
(p. 782).
This sounds painfully familiar. In relation to international law, such ‘slipping in of
the theory’ can be demonstrated by the teaching of the principle of non-interven‐
tion as one of the central tenets in the United Nations Charter (UNC). The doc‐
trine is that there is a prohibition of the use of force, Art. 2 (4) UNC, to which
there are two exceptions, provided in Art. 51 UNC (self-defence and UN Security
Council resolution). One might then interrogate why the Iraq war from 2003 was
regarded as ‘illegal’ under international law. For this, one would examine self-
defence in more detail: Must an attack already have occurred? What has the Inter‐
national Court of Justice stated in this regard? What was previous practice of Sta‐
tes prior to 2003? What do international law scholars think? How does the princi‐
ple of sovereignty come into this? In expounding on sovereignty, one might state
that the US has assumed a hegemonic position, allowing it to act despite the
action being ‘illegal’. There, hegemony was slipped in. Firstly, this presents the
complex issue of hegemony in a very simplistic, thin, way. Indeed, hegemony is
arguably equated with realism. Often, in teaching principles of international law
(and I have certainly been guilty of this), the lecturer will oscillate between lega‐
lism and realism. The rule will be presented (legalism) and then the relevant
power relations will be opposed to this (realism). International law states that the
use of force in Iraq was prohibited; yet, the US acted out of military and economic
reasons. Theory is reduced to crude categorizations, and rather than creating a
more nuanced idea, one has prompted an even larger distance between the acade‐
mic observer (student/teacher) and the event. A further problem with this
approach is that before slipping in the theory, one has already presented the doc‐
trine (the law) as opposed to politics; law has taken on a neutral voice of reason.
In addition, this slipping in of the theory happens, in essence, in every classroom.
When presenting this paper at a staff seminar at the University of Liverpool, all
lecturers (also the more conservative ones) stated that they work in this way. ‘The
anarchist intervenes in the most conventional of forms’, stated Peter Goodrich,
commenting on Duncan Kennedy’s choice of publishing his book on Critique with
Harvard University Press (Goodrich 2001, p. 979).
Case studies may provide an alternative approach. Gerry Simpson has previously
advocated for teaching with case studies, expounding on the importance of navi‐
gating between too broad a ‘theory of everything’ and the narrow legalistic focus
which will ‘founder on a lack of explanatory power’: ‘The solution lies in a severe,
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probably traumatic, narrowing of focus followed by a broadening of perspective’
(Simpson 1999, p. 89). An examination of the Iraq war may therefore start with
the relevant historical, political, and religious background. The teacher may invite
students to understand the narratives around the conflict, with the international
legal narrative being one of them.17 This could prevent assumptions about neu‐
trality of the law from being formed. But theory is not, of course, the only means
of critique. In order for a counter-hegemonic Bildungs-culture to take hold, one
could introduce a form of student-led teaching, changes to the physical setting of
the classroom, alternative uses of a normative language, and methods for taking
action against oppression. All these suggestions require much more in-depth
investigation, for which space (and possibly imagination) are lacking here.
Conclusion
In 1982, Duncan Kennedy wrote about the reproduction of hierarchy within law
schools. In 2013, law schools are still institutions in which the present order, its
biases and limitations, are reproduced. They privilege the understanding of
norms as neutral over political and indeterminate understandings; the ‘global
North’ over the ‘global South’; men over women; heterosexual over homosexual;
white over non-white. Yet, despite this grim diagnosis, Kennedy ends on a posi‐
tive note, a suggestion for restructuring (Kennedy 1982, p. 610f).
My optimistic note relates to the idea of Bildung as a form of emancipation; a
counter-hegemonic idea with which to resist the current neoliberal trajectory of
higher education. Bertold Brecht’s poem ‘In Praise of Learning’ signals the poten‐
tial for emancipation through learning particularly powerfully.
Learn, man in the asylum!
Learn, man in prison!
Learn, woman in the kitchen!
Learn, sixty-year-old!
You must take the lead.
Find a school, homeless person!
Acquire knowledge, you who are freezing!
You who are hungry, grab for a book: It is a weapon.
You must take the lead.18
The poem is addressed to the weak in society, those who are disadvantaged. Each
paragraph ends on ‘You must take the lead’. Notably, this poem was regarded as
so radical in the post-war United States, that it was the central piece Brecht was
17 I have attempted this in designing a module for undergraduate students at Liverpool Law School
titled ‘Public International Law in Current Affairs’ (http://www.liv.ac.uk/info/portal/pls/por
tal30/tulwwwmerge.mergepage?p_template=m_lw&p_tulipproc=moddets&p_params=%3Fp_
module_id%3D46928, accesssed 21 July 2013).
18 This is an excerpt from the poem in Brecht 1932/2011. My own translation.
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questioned on by the ‘House of Un-American Activities Committee’.19 In 1947,
Brecht’s anti-Nazi activities (which he had previously been celebrated for) looked
to the Americans to be communist and revolutionary activities. Such suspicion
illustrates particularly well how the neoliberal system is opposed to empowering
those who are disempowered. Law schools should sit at the centre of empower‐
ment of the disenfranchised rather than reproduce disempowerment of the weak.
And, in the end, this is arguably the message educators want their students to
take away with them. Orford has summarized this in regard to international law
as educating ‘ethically aware global citizens’ (Orford 1995, p. 251).
Knowledge is not only a tool, or a weapon, for successfully attaining a profession.
And Bildung is not merely a technique by which to impart knowledge. On the one
hand, one may take from this that knowledge is not just about instrumentalism;
however, I think the message is that knowledge is not about instrumentalism in a
narrow sense, simply concerning the possibilities of the individual. Knowledge
can also be instrumental in a wider sense, concerning the possibilities of addres‐
sing pressing concerns of society at large.
My final paragraph shall be dedicated to an anecdote from my own teaching – a
moment which I found heartening and encouraging. At the beginning of my Criti‐
cal Approaches to International Criminal Law class, I set out some of the themes
we would be investigating in the course of the term. I listed issues of ‘ICL and
gender’, ‘ICL and neoliberalism’, ‘ICL and justice’, ‘ICL and utopia’, and ‘ICL and
hegemony’. I said a few sentences about each issue. I then asked the students to
tell me what it was that they were hoping to get out of the course. One student, a
charming 78-year-old, a self-proclaimed conservative, with equally self-proclai‐
med right-wing tendencies, who was born into a self-identity of the ‘greatness’ of
the UK, and had previously worked in law enforcement with the Greater Man‐
chester Police said: ‘I’d like to learn what hegemony means.’
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Skeptical Legal Education
Bart van Klink & Bald de Vries
Law teachers at the university want stu‐
dents to develop a critical attitude. But
what exactly does it mean to be critical and
why is it important to be critical? How can
a critical attitude be promoted? In this arti‐
cle we intend to elucidate the role that cri‐
tical thinking may play in legal education.
We will introduce the idea of skeptical legal
education, which is to a large extent based
on Michael Oakeshott’s understanding of
liberal learning but which relativizes its
insistence on the non-instrumentality of
learning and reinforces its critical poten‐
tial. Subsequently, the article presents a
teaching experiment, where students,
based on self-organization, study and dis‐
cuss basic texts in order to encourage criti‐
cal thinking.
Legal Dogmatics and Academic Education
Jan Struiksma
Previously a model was developed whereby
the evolution of dogmatic legal theory
design can be made more explicit. This con‐
cerns, amongst other aspects, the applica‐
tion of the empirical cycle constructed by
De Groot, which forms the final element of
an evolution of the application of mundane
knowledge to theory design. The starting
point of this article is that this evolution
must be ‘repeated’ during an academic
study in empirical subjects. The objective is
to investigate how this is done in the legal
dogmatic education.
Alternative Methodologies: Learning
Critique as a Skill
Bal Sokhi-Bulley
How can we teach critical legal education?
The article tackles this key question by
focusing on the role of methodology in
legal education and research. I argue that
critical legal education requires marketing
methodology as a ‘skill’, thereby freeing it
from what students and researchers in Law
often view as the negative connotations of
‘theory’. This skill requires exploring ‘alter‐
native methodologies’ – those critical per‐
spectives that depart from legal positivism
and which Law traditionally regards as
‘peripheral’. As an example, the article
explores the Foucauldian concept of gover‐
nmentality as a useful methodological tool.
The article also discusses the difference
between theory, methodology and method,
and reviews current academic contributi‐
ons on law and method(ology). Ultimately,
it suggests a need for a ‘revolt of conduct’
in legal education. Perhaps then we might
hope for students that are not docile and
disengaged (despite being successful lawy‐
ers) but, rather, able to nurture an attitude
that allows for ‘thinking’ (law) critically.




This article examines the importance of the
social evidence base in relation to the
development of the law. It argues that
there is a need for those lawyers who play a
part in law reform (legislators and those
involved in the law reform process) and for
those who play a part in formulating
policy-based common law rules (judges and
practitioners) to know more about how
facts are established in the social sciences.
It argues that lawyers need sufficient
knowledge and skills in order to be able to
critically assess the facts and evidence base
when examining new legislation and also
when preparing, arguing and determining
the outcomes of legal disputes. For this
reason the article argues that lawyers need
enhanced training in empirical methodolo‐
gies in order to function effectively in
modern legal contexts.
‘I’d like to learn what hegemony means’
Christine E.J. Schwöbel-Patel
This contribution explores the possibility
of teaching international law in a critical
fashion. I examine whether the training
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which is taking place at law schools is esta‐
blishing and sustaining a cultural hege‐
mony (a term borrowed from Antonio
Gramsci). I ask whether the current focus
on technical practice-oriented teaching is a
condition which should be questioned,
even disrupted? In my thoughts on reor‐
ientations of this culture, a central term is
the German word Bildung. Bildung refers
to knowledge and education as an end in
itself (John Dewey) as well as an organic
process (Hegel), and therefore incorporates
a wider understanding than the English
word ‘education’. In terms of international
law, a notion of Bildung allows us to ack‐
nowledge the political nature of the disci‐
pline; it may even allow us to ‘politicize’
our students.
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